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Almost universal codes for MIMO wiretap channels
Laura Luzzi, Roope Vehkalahti and Cong Ling
Abstract—Despite several works on secrecy coding for fading
and MIMO wiretap channels from an error probability perspec-
tive, the construction of information-theoretically secure codes
over such channels remains an open problem. In this paper, we
consider a fading wiretap channel model where the transmitter
has only partial statistical channel state information. Our channel
model includes static channels, i.i.d. block fading channels, and
ergodic stationary fading with fast decay of large deviations for
the eavesdropper’s channel.
We extend the flatness factor criterion from the Gaussian
wiretap channel to fading and MIMO wiretap channels, and
establish a simple design criterion where the normalized product
distance / minimum determinant of the lattice and its dual should
be maximized simultaneously.
Moreover, we propose concrete lattice codes satisfying this
design criterion, which are built from algebraic number fields
with constant root discriminant in the single-antenna case, and
from division algebras centered at such number fields in the
multiple-antenna case. The proposed lattice codes achieve strong
secrecy and semantic security for all rates R < Cb−Ce−κ, where
Cb and Ce are Bob and Eve’s channel capacities respectively, and
κ is an explicit constant gap. Furthermore, these codes are almost
universal in the sense that a fixed code is good for secrecy for a
wide range of fading models.
Finally, we consider a compound wiretap model with a more
restricted uncertainty set, and show that rates R < C¯b − C¯e − κ
are achievable, where C¯b is a lower bound for Bob’s capacity
and C¯e is an upper bound for Eve’s capacity for all the channels
in the set.
Index Terms—algebraic number theory, division algebras,
fading wiretap channel, information theoretic security, lattice
coding, MIMO wiretap channel, statistical CSIT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel model was introduced by Wyner [2],
who showed that secure and reliable communication can be
achieved simultaneously over noisy channels even without
the use of secret keys. Wyner’s secrecy condition, which is
sometimes called the weak secrecy condition, requires that
the normalized mutual information 1k I(M ;Z
k) between the
confidential message M and the channel output Zk should
vanish when the code length k tends to infinity. However,
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certain weak secrecy schemes exhibit security flaws [3], and
today the most widely accepted secrecy metric in the infor-
mation theory community is Csisza´r’s strong secrecy [4], i.e.
I(M ;Zk) should tend to zero when k tends to infinity.
While in the information theory community confidential
messages are often assumed to be uniformly distributed, this
assumption is not accepted in cryptography. A cryptographic
treatment of the wiretap channel was proposed in [5] to com-
bine the requirements of the two communities, establishing
that achieving semantic security in the cryptographic sense is
equivalent to achieving strong secrecy for all distributions of
the message. This equivalence holds to some extent also for
continuous channels [6, Proposition 1].
A. Known results on the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels
The original work of Wyner considered discrete channels;
the Gaussian wiretap channel was first studied in [7] where
it was proven that its (weak) secrecy capacity is Cb − Ce,
where Cb and Ce are the capacities of Bob and Eve’s channels
respectively. Ergodic fading models were first considered
in [8, 9] and their secrecy capacity was investigated under
the assumption of perfect channel state information at the
transmitter (CSIT); [9] also considered the scenario where the
CSI of the legitimate channel is perfectly known, but there is
only statistical information about the wiretapper’s channel, and
gave some degrees of freedom results in this case. All these
early works were under the assumption of weak secrecy.
Clearly, the assumption of perfect CSIT about Eve’s channel
is unrealistic in most cases, and for fast fading channels, even
the assumption of perfect CSIT about Bob’s channel may be
problematic. A general (non-explicit) formula for the secrecy
capacity of a fading wiretap channel with imperfect CSIT
was given in [10] for an intermediate secrecy metric based
on variational distance. With statistical CSIT only, the weak
secrecy capacity is Cb −Ce for i.i.d. Rayleigh fading wiretap
channels such that Bob and Eve’s channels are independent
[11].
Note that while it is often argued that it is possible to obtain
strong secrecy from weak secrecy “for free” using the privacy
amplification technique in [12], applying this technique to
fading channels without CSIT seems to be an open problem;
see the discussion in [13].
The weak secrecy capacity of multiple-input multiple output
(MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channels was investigated in [14–
17] assuming perfect CSIT. In this setting, it was also shown
in [18] that the MIMO channel can be decomposed into
parallel channels, allowing to use scalar Gaussian codebooks
to achieve strong secrecy.
The case of fading channels where only statistical CSIT is
available is less well-understood. In [19] it was shown that
2the weak secrecy capacity for i.i.d. Rayleigh fading MIMO
wiretap channels is Cb − Ce if Bob and Eve’s channels are
independent.
Yet these channel models are rather restrictive, since know-
ing the channel statistics of the wiretapper is a strong assump-
tion. A more general model is the compound channel1, where
Bob and Eve’s channels belong to a certain uncertainty set
(Db,De). Following the standard convention in [20] we say
that a sequence of wiretap codes achieve rate R if it achieves
the strong secrecy rate R for each of the pairs (Db, De) ∈
(Db,De) in the uncertainty set uniformly, i.e. Eve’s leakage
and Bob’s error probability tend to zero uniformly. The com-
pound capacity can then be defined as the maximal achievable
rate. The ultimate goal of code design would then be to find a
code that uniformly achieves rate Cb −Ce for all the channel
pairs such that Bob’s capacity is lower bounded by Cb and
Eve’s capacity is upper bounded by Ce. Unfortunately it is not
known whether this goal is achievable. The secrecy capacity
of degraded compound wiretap channels was studied in [21–
23]. An arbitrarily varying MIMO channel with no CSI about
the wiretapper was considered in [13], assuming perfect CSI
of the legitimate channel and that the wiretapper has less
antennas than the legitimate receiver. For arbitrarily varying
wiretap channels, the deterministic compound capacity was
shown to be discontinuous with respect to small variations in
the uncertainty set [24].
If we relax the constraint of uniform convergence in the
definition of compound capacity as in Han’s definition [25]
(see also the discussion in [26]), then we can deal with more
general uncertainty sets. With Han’s definition, a wiretap code
achieves rate R over the compound channel if it achieves this
rate for any channel pair (Db, De) ∈ (Db,De) individually.
Obviously the compound capacity in Han’s sense cannot be
smaller than the standard compound capacity, but again it is
not known for general uncertainty sets.
B. Previous code constructions
Coding for wiretap channels. In the case of discrete memo-
ryless channels, the first wiretap code constructions were based
on polar codes [27] and LDPC codes [28] for degraded and
symmetric wiretap channels. The polar code construction was
extended to general wiretap channels in [29, 30].
Lattice codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel under an
error probability criterion were first proposed in [31, 32].
Subsequent works on algebraic lattice codes extended the error
probability approach to fading and MIMO channels [33–36].
In the case of Gaussian wiretap channels, [6] considered
the problem of designing lattice codes which achieve strong
secrecy and semantic security. Following an approach by
Csisza´r [4, 37], strong secrecy is guaranteed if the output
distributions of the eavesdropper’s channel corresponding to
different messages are indistinguishable in the sense of vari-
ational distance. To this aim, the flatness factor of a lattice
1 We note that typically the compound model in the MIMO literature refers
to a scenario where the uncertainty set consists of static channels. However,
one can consider more general uncertainty sets which contain both static and
time-varying channels.
was proposed in [6] as a fundamental criterion which implies
that conditional outputs are indistinguishable. Using random
coding arguments, it was shown that there exist families of
lattice codes which are good for secrecy, meaning that their
flatness factor is vanishing, and achieve strong secrecy and
semantic security for rates up to 1/2 nat from the secrecy
capacity. The work [38] adopted the flatness factor as a design
criterion in MIMO wiretap channels, yet it is unclear whether
that approach achieves strong secrecy.
Other non-algebraic lattice code constructions with strong
secrecy include polar lattices for Gaussian wiretap channels
[39]. A different approach (not based on lattices) in [40]
achieves the strong secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap
channel using 2-universal hash functions.
Universal codes for fading channels. Several previous
works considered the problem of designing universal codes
for fading and MIMO channels without secrecy constraints.
Division algebras were first used to obtain MIMO codes
that are “approximately universal” from the point of view
of the diversity-multiplexing gain trade-off in [41]. Lattice
codes with precoded-integer forcing were shown to achieve
constant gap to MIMO capacity in slow fading channels in
[42]. Most closely related to the present work, [43] proposed a
construction of algebraic lattices based on number field towers
which are almost universal over static and ergodic fading
MIMO channels. More recently, random lattice codes from
Generalized Construction A were shown to achieve compound
capacity for the uncertainty set of static MIMO channels
[44]. After this paper was first submitted, the Generalized
Construction A was extended to a MIMO wiretap setting [45].
C. Main contributions
Main results. We consider a MIMO fading wiretap channel
model where the transmitter has only access to partial statisti-
cal CSI, while the legitimate receiver has perfect knowledge of
its own channel, and the eavesdropper has perfect knowledge
of both channels. All static, i.i.d. fading and i.i.d. block
fading, and all ergodic fading models are allowed for the main
channel. For the eavesdropper’s channel, our results hold for
static channels, i.i.d. fading and block fading channels, and
stationary ergodic channels with faster than linear convergence
in the law of large numbers.
We propose an algebraic construction of lattices which
achieve strong secrecy and semantic security for all secrecy
rates R < Cb −Ce − κ, where Cb and Ce are Bob and Eve’s
channel capacities respectively, and κ is an explicit constant
gap which depends on the geometric invariants of the chosen
lattices2.
Our codes are almost universal in the sense that given Cb
and Ce, the same code is good for secrecy for a wide range
of fading models. Since for many of the channel models we
consider we don’t know the actual strong secrecy capacity, the
achievable rate Cb − Ce − κ provides a lower bound.
2For stationary ergodic eavesdropper’s channel models with slow conver-
gence in the law of large numbers, we can guarantee weak secrecy for the
same rates.
3Thanks to the universality property, our codes do achieve
a constant gap to the compound capacity in Han’s sense. The
gap is at most κ because for some wiretap channels in the
compound set, the achievable rate is at most Cb − Ce. For
individual fading channel pairs where the capacity is known
to be Cb − Ce, our gap to capacity is exactly κ.
We also consider a compound channel model with the
standard definition of compound capacity, and prove that if
we consider a more restrictive uncertainty set, then we can
guarantee uniform bounds for the error probability and the
leaked information, and our codes achieve a constant gap κ to
the standard compound capacity.
Unfortunately, for the best currently known families of
lattices from algebraic number fields the value of κ turns out
to be very large: 9.75 bits per complex channel use, which
for an i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channel corresponds to an SNR
advantage of approximately 30 dB for the legitimate receiver.
Some perspectives to improve this gap are discussed in the
conclusion of the paper.
Design criteria. We extend the secrecy criterion based on
the flatness factor in [6] to the case of fading and MIMO
channels and propose a family of concrete lattice codes from
algebraic number fields satisfying this criterion. Intuitively,
a vanishing flatness factor, to be defined precisely in our
paper, implies that the output distributions of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel corresponding to different messages converge to
the same distribution (which depends on the eavesdropper’s
channel). Hence no information is leaked to the eavesdropper
asymptotically, even if she knows her channel as well as the
legitimate user’s channel.
The key feature to guarantee secrecy is that the dual of
the faded lattice at the eavesdropper should have a good
minimum distance, so that the flatness factor of the faded
lattice vanishes with high probability. At the same time, to
guarantee reliability, the faded lattice at the legitimate receiver
should have a good minimum distance when the channel is not
in outage.
More precisely, we establish a simple design criterion
where the normalized product distance / normalized minimum
determinant of the lattice and its dual should be maximized
simultaneously; in the case of the Gaussian wiretap channel,
the packing density of the lattice and its dual should be
maximized3. The gap κ to the secrecy capacity only depends
on these geometric invariants.
Lattice construction. Our wiretap lattice codes are con-
structed from a particular sequence of algebraic number fields
with constant root discriminant4. These lattices were already
used in [47, 43] to design almost universal codes for fading and
MIMO channels without secrecy constraints. In this paper, we
show that the underlying multiplicative structure and constant
root discriminant property guarantee that the lattices and their
duals satisfy our joint design criteria for secrecy. Compared to
[43], we also improve the coding rate by replacing spherical
3The dual code also plays a role in the design of wiretap codes for discrete
memoryless channels, such as LDPC codes for binary erasure wiretap channels
[28].
4Coincidentally, the sequences of number fields that we consider are also
used in lattice-based cryptography [46].
shaping with a discrete Gaussian distribution over the infinite
lattice as in [6].
D. Organization of the paper
To make the paper reader-friendly, we present our method-
ology firstly for single-antenna fading wiretap channels, then
for MIMO wiretap channels, since the latter requires division
algebras which are more technical. The rest of the paper is
accordingly organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce
some technical tools, such as the lattice Gaussian distribution,
the flatness factor, and ideal lattices. Section III is devoted
to code construction and security proofs for single-antenna
fading wiretap channels. The proposed lattice codes can be
generalized to the MIMO case using the multi-block matrix
lattices from division algebras in [43]. This is accomplished in
Section IV and V, which may be skipped in the first reading.
In Section VI, we extend our achievability results to the
compound model. In Section VII, we discuss the implications
of our results in terms of code design criteria. Finally, Section
VIII concludes the paper and presents some open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic lattice definitions
In this section we recall some basic notions about lattices
and define the corresponding notations.
Consider Ck as a 2k-dimensional real vector space with the
real inner product
〈x,y〉 = ℜ(x†y). (1)
This inner product naturally defines a metric on the space Ck
by setting ‖x‖ = √〈x,x〉. With this inner product, we can
identify Ck with R2k with the canonical real inner product,
through the isometry
φ(z1, . . . , zk) = (ℜ(z1), . . . ,ℜ(zk),ℑ(zk), . . . ,ℑ(zk)). (2)
An n-dimensional lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of Rn
defined by
Λ = {MGx : x ∈ Zn},
where the columns of the generator matrix MG ∈Mn(R) are
linearly independent.
We consider lattices of even dimension n = 2k in the
Euclidean space R2k, which is identified with the complex
space Ck through (2). Given a lattice Λ ⊂ Ck, we define the
dual lattice as
Λ∗ = {x ∈ Ck | ∀y ∈ Λ, 〈x,y〉 ∈ Z}. (3)
A fundamental region of the lattice Λ is a measurable set
R(Λ) ⊂ Rn such that Rn is the disjoint union of the translates
of R(Λ), i.e. Rn = ⋃˙λ∈Λ(R(Λ) + λ). We denote by V (Λ)
the volume of any fundamental region of Λ, and by λ1(Λ) the
minimum distance of the lattice, i.e. the smallest norm of a
non-zero vector:
λ1(Λ) = min
λ∈Λ\{0}
‖λ‖ .
4B. Flatness factor and discrete Gaussian distribution
In this section, we define some fundamental lattice param-
eters that will be used in the rest of the paper. For more
background about the smoothing parameter and the flatness
factor in information theory and cryptography, we refer the
reader to [48, 6, 49].
Let f√Σ,c(z) denote the k-dimensional circularly symmetric
complex normal distribution with mean c and covariance
matrix Σ:
f√Σ,c(z) =
1
πk det(Σ)
e−(z−c)
†Σ−1(z−c) ∀z ∈ Ck.
We use the notation fσ,c(z) for fσI,c(z) and f√Σ for f√Σ,0.
Given a lattice Λ ⊂ Ck, we consider the Λ-periodic function
f√Σ,Λ(z) =
∑
λ∈Λ
f√Σ,λ(z), ∀z ∈ Ck.
Note that the restriction of f√Σ,Λ(z) to any fundamental
region R(Λ) is a probability distribution.
Definition 2.1: Given a complex lattice Λ ⊂ Ck and
a positive definite matrix Σ ∈ Mn(C), the flatness factor
ǫΛ(
√
Σ) is defined as the maximum deviation of f√Σ,Λ from
the uniform distribution over a fundamental region R(Λ) of
Λ, with volume V (Λ):
ǫΛ(
√
Σ) = max
z∈R(Λ)
∣∣∣V (Λ)f√Σ,Λ(z) − 1∣∣∣ .
Compared to [6], in this paper we use an extended version
of the flatness factor for correlated Gaussians, related to the
extended notion of the smoothing parameter in [49]. We also
extend the definition to the case of complex lattices. In the
case of scalar matrices we write ǫΛ(σ) = ǫΛ(σI).
Note that correlations can be absorbed by the lattice in
the sense that ǫΛ(
√
Σ) = ǫ√
Σ
−1
Λ
(I), and that ǫΛ(
√
Σ1) ≤
ǫΛ(
√
Σ2) if Σ1 and Σ2 are two positive definite matrices with
Σ1  Σ2.
Definition 2.2: Given a lattice Λ and ε > 0, the
smoothing parameter5 ηε(Λ) is the smallest s such that∑
λ∗∈Λ∗\{0} e
−pi2 s2‖λ∗‖2 ≤ ε, where Λ∗ is the dual lattice.
For scalar covariance matrices the smoothing parameter is
related to the flatness factor as follows [6]:
√
2πσ = ηε(Λ) if and only if ǫΛ(σI) = ε.
More generally, for Σ  0 we can say that
√
2πΣ  ηε(Λ) if ǫΛ(
√
Σ) ≤ ε. (4)
The smoothing parameter is upper bounded by the minimum
distance of the dual lattice [48]. More precisely, we have the
following corollary of a result by Banaszczyk [50]:
Lemma 2.3: Suppose that Λ is an n-dimensional lattice, and
consider two constants c > 1√
2pi
, C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
< 1.
If τ >
√
nc
λ1(Λ)
, then∑
λ∈Λ\{0}
e−τ
2pi‖λ‖2 ≤ C
n
1− Cn . (5)
5We define the smoothing parameter per complex dimension, which differs
by a factor
√
2 from the definition in [48]. We have adjusted the bounds on
ηε(Λ) accordingly.
Therefore the smoothing parameter of the dual lattice is
bounded as follows:
ηε(Λ
∗) ≤
√
2nc
λ1(Λ)
for ε =
Cn
1− Cn . (6)
Equivalently, in terms of the flatness factor,
ǫΛ∗
( √
nc√
πλ1(Λ)
)
≤ C
n
1− Cn . (7)
Proof: Let B be the open unit ball, and ρ(A) =∑
x∈A e
−pix2 . From Lemma 1.5 in [50] we have that
∀c ≥ 1√
2π
, ρ(Λ \ c√nB) < Cnρ(Λ),
where C = c
√
2πe e−pic
2
. Then we can write
ρ(Λ\ c√nB) < C2ρ(Λ) = Cnρ(Λ\ c√nB) + Cnρ(Λ ∩ c√nB)
⇒ ρ(Λ \ c√nB) < C
n
1− Cn ρ(Λ ∩ c
√
nB).
Now suppose that τ > c
√
n
λ1(Λ)
and consequently τΛ \ c√nB =
τΛ \ {0}. We have∑
λ∈Λ\{0}
e−τ
2pi‖λ‖2 =
∑
τλ∈τΛ\{0}
e−pi‖τλ‖
2
= ρ(τΛ \ {0})
= ρ(τΛ \ c√nB) < C
n
1− Cn ρ(Λ ∩ c
√
nB) = C
n
1− Cn ρ({0})
=
Cn
1− Cn .
The second tool that we need to define our lattice coding
schemes is the notion of discrete Gaussian distribution.
Given c ∈ Ck and Σ  0, the discrete Gaussian distribution
over the (shifted) lattice Λ− c ⊂ Ck is the following discrete
distribution taking values in Λ − c:
DΛ−c,√Σ(λ − c) =
f√Σ(λ− c)∑
λ′∈Λ f√Σ(λ
′ − c) .
The following result is a generalization of Regev’s
lemma [51, Claim 3.9] (see also [6, Lemma 8]) to correlated
Gaussian distributions. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.4: Let X1 be sampled according to the discrete
Gaussian distributionDΛ+c,
√
Σ1
andX2 be sampled according
to the continuous Gaussian f√Σ2 . Let Σ0 = Σ1 + Σ2 and
Σ−1 = Σ−11 +Σ
−1
2 . Denote by g(x) the density of the random
variable X = X1 +X2. If
ǫΛ(
√
Σ) ≤ ε ≤ 1
2
, (8)
then the L1 distance V( , ) between the distributions g and
f√Σ0 is bounded as follows:
V(g, f√Σ0) ≤ 4ε.
We will also need a basic result concerning linear transfor-
mations of discrete Gaussian distributions, which is proven in
Appendix B.
Lemma 2.5: Let X be sampled according to the k-
dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ+c,
√
Σ, and let
5A ∈ Mk(C) an invertible matrix. Then the distribution of
Y = AX is DA(Λ+c),
√
AΣA† .
Finally, we introduce subgaussian random variables, whose
tails behave similarly to the Gaussian tail distributions:
Definition 2.6: A random vector z taking values in Ck is
δ-subgaussian with parameter σ if ∀t ∈ Ck, E[eℜ(t†z)] ≤
eδe
σ2
4 ‖t‖2 .
For a complex Gaussian vector z ∼ NC(0,Σ), E[eℜ(t†z)] =
e
1
2 t
†Σt.
The following result holds (see also [52, Lemma 2.8]):
Lemma 2.7: Let x ∼ DΛ+c,σ be a k-dimensional discrete
complex Gaussian random variable, and let A ∈ Mk(C).
Suppose that ǫΛ(σ) < 1. Then ∀t ∈ Ck,
E[eℜ(t
†Ax)] ≤
(
1 + ǫΛ(σ)
1− ǫΛ(σ)
)
e
σ2
4 ‖A†t‖2 .
The proof can be found in Appendix C.
C. Ideal lattices from number fields with constant root dis-
criminant
Let us first formalize some properties of algebraic number
fields that are relevant for our construction of algebraic lattice
codes in the single-antenna case. We refer the reader to [53]
for the relevant notions about number fields.
Let F be a totally complex number field of degree [F :
Q] = 2k, with ring of integers OF . We denote by dF
the discriminant of the number field. The relative canonical
embedding of F into Ck is given by
ψ(x) = (σ1(x), . . . , σk(x)),
where {σ1, . . . , σk} is a set of Q-embeddings F → C such
that we have chosen one from each complex conjugate pair.
Assume that I is a fractional ideal of F , that is, there exists
some integer a such that aI is a proper ideal of OF . Then
Λ = ψ(I) is a 2k-dimensional lattice in Ck. In particular,
ψ(OF ) is a lattice.
We define the codifferent of F as
O∨F = {x ∈ F : TrF/Q(xOF ) ⊆ Z}.
The codifferent is a fractional ideal, and its algebraic norm is
the inverse of the discriminant:
N(O∨F ) = 1/dF . (9)
The codifferent embeds as the complex conjugate of the dual
lattice:
Λ∗ = 2ψ(O∨F ). (10)
Using Lemma 2.3, equation (6), we have that ∀c > 1√
2pi
ηεk(Λ) ≤
√
4kc
λ1(Λ∗)
=
√
kc
λ1(ψ(O∨F ))
. (11)
where εk =
C2k
1−C2k → 0 as k →∞.6
6A similar result is shown in [46, Lemma 6.2] for ε = 2−2k . In this paper
we prefer to consider general ε in order to get the best possible secrecy rates.
Due to the arithmetic mean – geometric mean inequality,
for any fractional ideal I of OF , λ1(ψ(I)) ≥
√
k(N(I)) 12k .
In particular, from (9) we get
λ1(ψ(O∨F )) = λ1(ψ(O∨F )) ≥
√
k/ |dF |
1
2k . (12)
Combining equations (11) and (12), we find that the smoothing
parameter of Λ is upper bounded by the root discriminant:
ηεk (Λ) ≤ c |dF |
1
2k for εk =
C2k
1− C2k . (13)
Note that as long as c > 1√
2pi
, we have C < 1 and εk → 0
exponentially fast, but the rate of convergence will get slower
if C is very close to 1.
In order to have small smoothing parameter when the dimen-
sion k is large, we need the discriminant |dF | to grow as
slowly as possible with k.
Given a family F = {Fk} of number fields with [Fk : Q] →
∞ as k →∞, we define the asymptotic root discriminant [54]
of F as
rdF = lim sup
k→∞
|dK |
1
[Fk:Q] . (14)
The following theorem by Martinet [55] proves the exis-
tence of infinite towers of totally complex number fields with
constant root discriminant:
Theorem 2.8 (Martinet): There exists an infinite tower of
totally complex number fields FC = {Fk} of degree 2k =
5 · 2t, such that
|dFk |
1
2k = G ≈ 92.368. (15)
Consequently, rdFC ≈ 92.368.
The value for rdF in Theorem 2.8 is not the best known
possible; the existence of a family of totally complex number
fields FHM with rdFHM < 82.2 was proved in [56]. However,
for the number fields in this family, the root discriminant is
not constant although it remains bounded.
Remark 2.9: Although in principle the number fields in the
families FC and FHM can be computed explicitly for fixed
degree k, at present an efficient algorithm to do so is not
available; see the discussion in [43].
Given a sequence F = {Fk} of number fields, we denote
by {Λ(k)F } = {ψ(OFk)} the corresponding sequence of lattices
in Ck, with volume
V (Λ
(k)
F ) = 2
−k√|dF |.
D. Ideal lattices and normalized product distance
Given an element x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Ck we will use the
notation p(x) =
∏k
i=1 |xi|, and define
p(Λ) = inf
x∈Λ\{0}
p(x).
A classically used parameter to design lattices for the
Rayleigh fast fading channel [57] is the normalized product
distance
Np(Λ) =
p(Λ)
V (Λ)
1
2
. (16)
The proof of the following will be given in Appendix D.
6Lemma 2.10: Let F/Q be a totally complex extension of
degree 2k and let ψ be the relative canonical embedding and
I a fractional ideal of F . Then
Np(ψ(I)) ≥ 2
k
2
|dF | 14
, Np(ψ(I)∗) ≥ 2
k
2
|dF | 14
.
In other words, given a fixed number field F , the product
distances of all its ideal lattices and their duals are lower
bounded by the same value 2
k
2 /|dF | 14 , which only depends
on the size of the discriminant of the field F .
This property of number fields immediately implies a result
concerning the euclidean distance of lattice points in ideal
lattices.
Definition 2.11: Given a 2k-dimensional lattice Λ in Ck, its
Hermite invariant is defined as
h(Λ) = inf
x∈Λ\{0}
||x||2
V (Λ)
1
k
=
λ1(Λ)
2
V (Λ)
1
k
.
Using the arithmetic – geometric mean inequality, we have
for all 2k-dimensional lattices that
(Np(Λ))2 ≤ h(φ(Λ))
k
kk
. (17)
Therefore, given a fixed number field F , for any ideal I we
have that
h(ψ(I)) ≥ 2k|dF |1/2k , h(ψ(I)
∗) ≥ 2k|dF |1/2k . (18)
In other words, given a number field with small discrim-
inant, then all the ideal lattices and their duals have large
Hermite invariants.
III. SINGLE-ANTENNA FADING WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. Channel model
We consider the single-antenna ergodic fading channel
model illustrated in Figure 1, where the outputs y and z at
Bob and Eve’s end are given by{
yi = hb,ixi + wb,i,
zi = he,ixi + we,i,
i = 1, . . . , k (19)
where wb,i, we,i are i.i.d. complex Gaussian vectors with
zero mean and variance σ2b , σ
2
e per complex dimension. A
confidential message M and an auxiliary message M ′ with
rate R and R′ respectively are encoded into x. We denote by
Mˆ the estimate of the confidential message at Bob’s end. We
define He = diag(he,1, . . . , he,k), Hb = diag(hb,1, . . . , hb,k).
The input x satisfies the average power constraint
1
k
k∑
i=1
|xi|2 ≤ P. (20)
We suppose that hb,i, he,i are isotropically invariant chan-
nels such that the channel capacities Cb and Ce are well-
defined. All rates are expressed in nats per complex channel
use.
We assume that the weak law of large numbers (LLN) holds
for Bob’s channel: ∀δ > 0
lim
k→∞
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P |hb,i|2
σ2b
)
− Cb
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
}
= 0, (21)
ALICE ENC Hb
⊕
DEC BOB
He
⊕
EVE
M,M ′ x y Mˆ
z
wb
we
Fig. 1. The fading wiretap channel.
This general setting includes the Gaussian channel, i.i.d. block
fading channels where the size of the blocks is fixed and the
number of blocks tends to infinity as well as all ergodic fading
channels.
Moreover, we require a stricter condition for Eve’s channel,
i.e. the asymptotic rate of convergence in the LLN should be
faster than o
(
1
k
)
: ∀δ′ > 0,
lim
k→∞
k P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
)
− Ce
∣∣∣∣∣> δ′
}
= 0 (22)
This condition is satisfied for static channels, i.i.d. fading
channels and i.i.d. block fading channels, and ergodic channels
whose decay of large deviations is vanishing with rate o
(
1
k
)
.7
Recall that in the ergodic case, Cb = Ehb
[
ln
(
1 + P |hb|
2
σ2b
)]
and Ce = Ehe
[
ln
(
1 + P |he|
2
σ2e
)]
, where hb and he are random
variables with the same first order distribution as the processes
{hb,i},{he,i} [58].
We suppose that Bob has perfect CSI of his own channel,
and Eve has perfect CSI of both channels. Alice has no
instantaneous CSI, apart from partial knowledge of channel
statistics. More precisely, the knowledge of Cb and Ce and of
the properties (21) and (22) is sufficient for Alice.
Definition 3.1: A coding scheme achieves strong secrecy if
lim
k→∞
P{Mˆ 6=M} = 0,
lim
k→∞
I(M ; z, He) = 0.
Definition 3.2: A coding scheme achieves weak secrecy if
lim
k→∞
P{Mˆ 6= M} = 0,
lim
k→∞
1
k
I(M ; z, He) = 0.
Remark 3.3: Even if Eve knows Bob’s channelHb, and even
though He and Hb are possibly correlated, the leakage can
still be expressed as I(M ; z, He). In fact, the Markov chain
7This condition was missing in the conference version of this paper [1],
where it was stated that Corollary 3.7 holds whenever Eve’s channel is ergodic.
Actually ergodicity is not sufficient with the current approach. Here we make
that statement more precise.
7z−He−Hb always holds, and using the chain rule for mutual
information twice we get
I(M ; z|He, Hb) = I(M,Hb; z|He)− I(Hb; z|He)
= I(M,Hb; z|He) = I(M ; z|He)− I(Hb; z|M,He)
= I(M ; z|He).
Remark 3.4: To the best of our knowledge, in the case
of statistical CSIT only, for general channels the strong
and weak secrecy capacities Cs and C
w
s are not known.
In [11] the equality Cws = Cb − Ce was shown in the
case of i.i.d. Rayleigh fading channels where Bob and Eve’s
channels are independent8. In [59, Lemma 2], it was shown
that Cws ≥ Cb − Ce for arbitrary wiretap channels. In [37]
(Corollary 2 and remarks about Theorem 3) it was noted
that this result extends to the strong secrecy metrics for i.i.d.
channels provided that exponential convergence holds in the
Chernoff bound; [10] deals with general ergodic channels but
considers an intermediate secrecy metrics (stronger than weak
secrecy but weaker than strong secrecy).
B. Lattice wiretap coding
Let Λ
(k)
e ⊂ Λ(k)b be a pair of nested lattices in Ck with
nesting ratio |Λb/Λe| = ekR, and volumes
V (Λe) =
(πeP )k
ekR′
, V (Λb) =
(πeP )k
ek(R+R′)
, (23)
where R′ > 0. To simplify the notation, we will omit the
dependence on k of the lattices unless necessary.
Let R(Λe) be a fundamental region of Λe. We consider the
secrecy scheme in [6], where each confidential message m ∈
M = {1, . . . , ekR} is associated to a coset leader λm ∈ Λb ∩
R(Λe). To transmit the message m, Alice samples x ∈ Λb
from the discrete Gaussian DΛe+λm,σs with σ
2
s = P . We
denote this lattice coding scheme by C(Λb,Λe).
Remark 3.5 (Power constraint and rate of auxiliary mes-
sage): Let θt =
pi−t
pi → 1 as t→ 0. It follows from [6, Lemma
6 and Remark 6] that ∀ 0 < t < π, if εk = ǫΛ(k)e (
√
θtP ) < 1,∣∣∣E[‖x‖2]− kP ∣∣∣ ≤ 2πεk
1− εkP.
Thus as k → ∞, the variance per complex dimension of x
tends to P provided that
lim
k→∞
ǫ
Λ
(k)
e
(
√
θtP ) = 0, (24)
and the power constraint (20) is verified asymptotically9. From
[6, Lemma 7 and Remark 7], the information rate H(M ′) of
the auxiliary message M ′ (corresponding to the choice of a
point in Λe) is bounded by∣∣∣∣H(M ′)− (ln(πeP )− 1k lnV (Λe)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ νt(εk)
= − log(1 − εk) + π
1− εk εk(1 + 1/t
4),
8Note that the weak secrecy capacity is an upper bound for the strong
secrecy capacity.
9More precisely, one can choose any σ2s < P , so that the power constraint
is verified for k large enough. We omit this step to simplify the notation.
where νt(ǫk)→ 0 as ǫk → 0. Therefore we have
|H(M ′)−R′| ≤ νt(ǫk).
If ǫk → 0, the entropy rate of the auxiliary message tends to
R′ as k →∞.
Coding scheme based on number fields with constant root
discriminant. Given a sequence F = {Fk} of number fields,
let {Λ(k)F } be the family of lattices defined in Section II-C.
We consider scaled versions Λb = αbΛ
(k)
F , Λe = αeΛ
(k)
F such
that (23) holds.
Since the choice of R and R′ determines the scaling factors
αb and αe, we will denote the corresponding lattice coding
scheme by C(ΛF , R,R′).
C. Achievable secrecy rates
We now state our main result, which will be proven in
sections III-D and III-E:
Theorem 3.6: Consider the wiretap scheme C(Λb,Λe) in
Section III-B, and suppose that there exist positive constants
tb, te such that
lim inf
k→∞
Np(Λb)
2/k ≥ tb, lim inf
k→∞
Np(Λ∗e)
2/k ≥ te. (25)
where Np is the normalized product distance defined in (16).
If the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel verify the
conditions (21) and (22), then the codes C(Λb,Λe) achieve
strong secrecy for any message distribution pM , and thus they
achieve semantic security, if
R′ > Ce + ln
( e
π
)
− ln te,
R+R′ < Cb − ln
(
4
πe
)
+ ln tb.
(26)
Thus, any strong secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − 2 ln
(
2
π
)
+ ln tbte
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes.
Then, we can state the following Corollary.
Corollary 3.7: Let F = {Fk} be a sequence of number
fields with rdF < ∞, where rdF is the asymptotic root
discriminant defined in (14). If the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s channel verify the conditions (21) and (22)
respectively, then the wiretap coding scheme C(ΛF , R,R′)
achieves strong secrecy and semantic security if
R′ > Ce+ln
(
e rdF
2π
)
, R+R′ < Cb−ln
(
2 rdF
πe
)
. (27)
Thus, any strong secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − 2 ln (rdF /π)
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes.
Proof of the Corollary: By using the definition of
normalized product distance and Lemma 2.10 we find
that for the number field lattices C(ΛF , R,R′) we have
lim infk→∞ Np(Λe)
2
k ≥ 2/ rdF and lim infk→∞ Np(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥
2/ rdF .
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Fig. 2. Achievable rate for a single-antenna i.i.d. Rayleigh wiretap channel,
where the SNR for Eve is fixed at 5 dB.
Remark 3.8: Let S(Cb, Ce) denote the set of all ergodic
stationary isotropically invariant fading processes {(Hb, He)}
such that (21) and (22) hold. The proposed codes are al-
most universal in the sense that a fixed coding scheme
C(Λ(k), R,R′) with rates satisfying (26) achieves strong se-
crecy and semantic security over all channels in the set
S(Cb, Ce). Moreover, it is clear from the statement of Corol-
lary 3.7 that this fixed code will also achieve secrecy over all
fading processes in S(C′b, C′e) for all C′b ≥ Cb and for all
C′e ≤ Ce.
Although a rate of convergence of the order o
(
1
k
)
in the law
of large numbers for Eve’s channel seems to be necessary for
strong secrecy, any rate of convergence is enough to guarantee
weak secrecy:
Proposition 3.9: Suppose that (25) holds for the wiretap
scheme C(Λb,Λe). If the condition (21) holds for the main
channel and ∀δ′ > 0 we have
lim
k→∞
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
)
− Ce
∣∣∣∣∣> δ′
}
= 0 (28)
for the eavesdropper’s channel, then C(Λb,Λe) achieves weak
secrecy for all rates (26).
In particular, if rdF < ∞, any weak secrecy rate R < Cb −
Ce−2 ln (rdF /π) is achievable with the codes C(ΛF , R,R′).
A sketch of the proof of Proposition 3.9 can be found in
Appendix F.
Remark 3.10: At least in the settings in which the secrecy
capacity is known and is equal to Cs = Cb −Ce, when using
the Martinet family of number fields FC the proposed lattice
schemes incur a gap to secrecy capacity of 2 ln(G/π) nats per
channel use with G = rdFC ≈ 92.368, i.e. approximately 6.76
nats (or 9.76 bits) per channel use. When the main channel
and eavesdropper’s channel are i.i.d. Rayleigh channels, this
corresponds to an SNR gap of approximately 30 dB (see
Figure 2).
D. Proof of Theorem 3.6: Secrecy
Let x ∈ Λb be the lattice point sampled by Alice from the
discrete Gaussian DΛe+λM ,σs . Then, the received signal z at
Eve’s end is z = Hex + we. Since the message M and the
channel He are independent, the leakage can be expressed as
follows:
I(M ; z, He) = I(M ;He) + I(M ; z|He) = I(M ; z|He)
= EHe
[
I(pM|He ; pz|He)
]
= EHe
[
I(pM ; pz|He)
]
. (29)
We want to show that the average leakage with respect to
the fading is small. In order to do so, we will show that for any
confidential message m, the output distributions pz|He,M=m
are close to a Gaussian distribution with high probability.
1) Fixed channel sequence. First, we prove a bound
for the leakage for a fixed channel sequence He =
diag(he,1, . . . , he,k).
Proposition 3.11 (Bound for the leakage): Suppose that
Np(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ te for the 2k-dimensional lattice Λe, and
that He = diag(he,1, . . . , he,k) is fixed and such that
1
k
∑k
i=1 ln
(
1 + Pσ2e
|he,i|2
)
≤ C¯e.
Then ∀c > 1√
2pi
, if R′ ≥ C¯e + ln(2c2e) − ln te, for
sufficiently large k ≥ k¯(c), the leakage is bounded by
I(pM ; pz|He) ≤ 8kεkR − 8εk ln 8εk, where εk = C
2k
1−C2k and
C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
.
Proof: For a fixed channel realization He and a fixed
message M = m, from Lemma 2.5 we have that Hex ∼
D
HeΛe+Heλm,
√
HeH
†
e
√
P
. Using Lemma 2.4 with Σ1 =
HeH
†
eP , Σ2 = σ
2
eI , we have
V(pz|He,M=m, f√Σ0) ≤ 4εk
provided that
ǫHeΛe(
√
Σ) = ǫ√
Σ
−1
HeΛe
(1) ≤ εk ≤ 1
2
, (30)
where we define
Σ0 = HeH
†
eP + σ
2
eI, Σ
−1 =
(HeH
†
e )
−1
P
+
I
σ2e
.
Recalling the upper bound (6) in Lemma 2.3, we have that for
any c > 1√
2pi
, C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
, εk =
C2k
1−C2k ,
ηεk(
√
Σ−1HeΛe) ≤ 2c
√
k
λ1((
√
Σ−1HeΛe)∗)
=
2c
√
k
λ1(
√
Σ(H†e)−1Λ∗e)
. (31)
Using (10) and the arithmetic mean – geometric mean inequal-
ity,
λ1(
√
Σ(H†e )
−1Λ∗e)
≥
√
k
k∏
i=1
(
Pσ2e
σ2e + P |he,i|2
) 1
2k
min
x∈Λ∗e\{0}
k∏
i=1
|xi|
1
k
=
√
k
k∏
i=1
(
Pσ2e
σ2e + P |he,i|2
) 1
2k
p(Λ∗e)
1
k
Replacing in (31), we find that
ηεk(
√
Σ−1HeΛe) ≤
2c
∏k
i=1(1 +
P
σ2e
|he,i|2) 12k
p(Λ∗e)
1
k
√
P
. (32)
9Equivalently, in terms of flatness factor we have
ǫ√Σ−1HeΛe
2c∏ki=1(1 + Pσ2e |he,i|2) 12k
p(Λ∗e)
1
k
√
2πP
 ≤ εk
for fixed fading He. Now suppose that
2ce
C¯e
2
p(Λ∗e)
1
k
√
2πP
≤ 1. (33)
Then (30) holds for sufficiently large k (depending only on c)
and it follows from [6, Lemma 2] that
I(pM ; pz|He) ≤ 8kεkR− 8εk ln 8εk. (34)
Recalling the definition of normalized product distance and
the scaling condition (23), we have
Np(Λ∗e) =
p(Λ∗e)√
V (Λ∗e)
= p(Λ∗e)
√
V (Λe) = p(Λ
∗
e)
√
πeP
k
ekR′/2
.
Thus we can rewrite the condition (33) as
2ec2eC¯e
Np(Λ∗e)
2
k eR′
≤ 1
In particular if the bound (25) holds for Np(Λ∗e)
2/k , this
condition will be guaranteed if
2ec2eC¯e
teeR
′ ≤ 1.
or equivalently if R′ ≥ C¯e + ln
(
2ec2
)− ln te.
2) Random channel sequence. For a random channel se-
quence He = diag(he,1, . . . , he,k), we can bound the leakage
as follows:
EHe
[
I(pM ; pz|He)
]
≤ P
{ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
) 1
k
> eCe+δ
}
(kR)
+ EHe
[
I(pM ; pz|He)
∣∣∣ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
) 1
k≤ eCe+δ
]
. (35)
Given δ > 0, the law of large numbers (22) implies that
P
{
k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P
σ2e
|he,i|2
) 1
k
> eCe+δ
}
→ 0. (36)
Therefore the first term vanishes when k → ∞. If the bound
(25) holds, then ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently large k, Np(Λ∗e)2/k >
te−γ. Using Proposition 3.11, ∀γ > 0, the second term in (35)
tends to zero and the scheme achieves strong secrecy provided
that
R′ ≥ Ce + δ + ln(2c2e)− ln(te − γ).
Since this is true for any δ, γ > 0 and any c > 1√
2pi
, we find
that a rate
R′ > Ce + ln
( e
π
)
− ln te (37)
is required for strong secrecy.
Remark 3.12: In equation (37), we improve the gap com-
pared to the conference version of this paper, due to consid-
ering general c > 1√
2pi
rather than c = 1.
Remark 3.13: In this proof we are only using the fact that
the probability to have a good channel for Eve is vanishing
faster than 1k . Consequently, in the case when Alice does not
know Eve’s channel capacity Ce but only knows an upper
bound C¯e ≥ Ce such that
lim
k→∞
k P
{
1
k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
)
> C¯e + δ
′
}
= 0 (38)
holds, strong secrecy is still guaranteed provided that R′ >
C¯e + ln
(
e
pi
)− ln te.
3) Power constraint and rate of auxiliary message. We still
need to check that the condition (24) holds. This is required
for the power constraint (20), and implies that the information
rate of the auxiliary message tends to R′ asymptotically (see
Remark 3.5).
Proposition 3.14 (Bound for the flatness factor): Suppose
that Np(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ te for the 2k-dimensional lattice Λe. Let 0 <
t < π, θt =
pi−t
pi and c >
1√
2pi
. If R′ ≥ ln(2ec2)−ln te−ln θt,
then ǫΛe(
√
θtP ) ≤ εk = C2k1−C2k , where C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
.
Proof: By the arithmetic–geometric mean inequality,
λ1(Λ
∗
e) ≥
√
kp(Λ∗e)
1
k =
√
k
Np(Λ∗e)
1
k
V (Λ∗e)
1
k
≥
√
kNp(Λ∗e)
1
k
eR
′/2
√
πeP
≥
√
k
√
te
eR
′/2
√
πeP
Then for εk =
C2k
1−C2k , we have
ηεk(Λe) ≤
2c
√
k
λ1(Λ∗e)
≤ 2c
√
πeP√
tee
R′
2
Therefore εΛe(
√
θtP ) = εk → 0 provided that√
θtP ≥ 2c
√
πeP√
teeR
′/2
√
2π
,
or equivalently R′ ≥ ln(2c2e)− ln te − ln θt.
For c→ 1√
2pi
and t→ 0, θt → 1, we find the condition
R′ > ln
( e
π
)
− ln te, (39)
which is weaker than (37).
E. Proof of Theorem 3.6: Reliability
Recall that to transmit the message m, Alice samples x
from the discrete Gaussian DΛe+λm,σs .
Let y = Hbx+wb be the received signal at Bob. Note that if
Bob correctly decodes x, he can also identify the right coset
of Λe in Λb, and consequently the confidential message m.
1) Fixed channel sequence. First of all, we prove an upper
bound for Bob’s finite-length error probability for a given
sequence of channels Hb = diag(hb,1, . . . , hb,k).
Proposition 3.15 (Bound for the error probability): Suppose
that Np(Λb)
2
k ≥ tb, Np(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ te for the 2k-dimensional
lattices Λb and Λe, and thatHb = diag(hb,1, . . . , hb,k) is given
with 1k
∑k
i=1 ln
(
1 + P
σ2b
|hb,i|2
)
≥ C¯b.
Then ∀c > 1√
2pi
, for code rates R+R′ < C¯b−ln
(
8c2
e
)
+ln tb,
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R′ > ln(2ec2) − ln te, the ML error probability for Bob is
bounded by
Pe ≤ 1 + εk
1− εk εk,
where εk =
C2k
1−C2k , and C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
.
Proof: We suppose that Bob performs MMSE-GDFE
preprocessing as in [60]: let ρb =
P
σ2b
, and consider the QR
decomposition
H˜b =
(
Hb
1√
ρb
I
)
=
(
Q1
Q2
)
R,
where R,Q1 ∈Mk(C). Observe that H˜†b H˜b = H†bHb + Iρb =
R†R, and
‖y −Hbx‖2 + 1
ρb
‖x‖2
= x†HbHbx+ y†Hbx− x†H†by + y†y +
x†x
ρb
= x†R†Rx− y†Q1Rx− x†R†Q†1y + y†y
=
∥∥∥Q†1y −Rx∥∥∥2 + C,
where C is a constant which does not depend on x.
Since the distribution of x is not uniform, MAP decoding
is not equivalent to ML. However, similarly to [6, Theorem
5], for fixed Hb which is known at the receiver, the result of
MAP decoding can be written as
xˆMAP = argmax
x∈Λb
p(x|y) = argmax
x∈Λb
(p(x)p(y|x))
= argmax
x∈Λb
(
e−
‖x‖2
2P e
−‖y−Hbx‖
2
2σ2
b
)
= argmin
x∈Λb
(
1
ρb
‖x‖2 + ‖y −Hbx‖2
)
= argmin
x∈Λb
∥∥∥Q†1y −Rx∥∥∥2 .
Thus, Bob can compute
y′ = Q†1y = Rx+ v, (40)
where v = Q†1wb − 1ρb (R−1)†x [60].
Clearly, the error probability for the original system model
with optimal (MAP) decoding is upper bounded by the ML
error probability for the system model (40).
The noise v is the sum of a discrete Gaussian and of
a continuous Gaussian. We will show that its tails behave
similarly to a Gaussian random variable.
Suppose that a fixed message m has been transmitted, so
that x ∼ DΛe+λm,√P . It follows from Lemma 2.7 that x is
δ-subgaussian with parameter
√
P for δ = ln
(
1+ε
1−ε
)
provided
that
ε = ǫΛe(
√
P ) < 1, (41)
which is guaranteed by (39). This is weaker than the condition
(37) we have already imposed for secrecy, so it doesn’t affect
the achievable secrecy rate. Consequently, for the equivalent
noise v,
E[eℜ(t
†
v)] = E
[
eℜ(t
†Q†1wb)
]
E
[
e
−ℜ
(
1
ρb
t
†(R−1)†x
)]
≤
(
1 + ε
1− ε
)
e
σ2b
4 t
†
(
Q†1Q1+
1
ρb
(R−1)†R−1
)
t
=
(
1 + ε
1− ε
)
e
σ2b
4 ‖t‖2
since
Q†1Q1+
1
ρb
(R−1)†R−1 = (R−1)†
(
H†bHb +
1
ρb
I
)
R−1 = I.
Therefore, v is δ-subgaussian with parameter σb.
For fixed R, from the union bound for the error probability
we get
Pe(R) ≤
∑
x′∈Λb,x′ 6=x
P {x→ x′|R}
Note that we have
P {x→ x′|R} = P
{
‖v −R(x− x′)‖2 ≤ ‖v‖2
}
= P
{
2〈R(x− x′),v〉 ≥ ‖R(x− x′)‖2
}
= P
{
a ≥ 1
2
‖R(x− x′)‖
}
where a = ℜ
(
(R(x−x′))†v
‖R(x−x′)‖
)
is a real scalar random variable
with zero mean. By subgaussianity of v, ∀t > 0
E[eta] ≤ eδe
σ2b
4 t
2
.
Using the Chernoff bound, we find that ∀t > 0
P
{
a ≥ 1
2
‖R(x− x′)‖
}
≤ E[eta]e− t2‖R(x−x′)‖
≤ eδe
σ2b
4 t
2
e−
t
2‖R(x−x′)‖
The tightest bound is obtained for t = ‖R(x− x′)‖ /σ2b and
yields
P {x→ x′|R} ≤ eδe−
‖R(x−x′)‖2
4σ2
b .
Therefore we find
Pe(R) ≤ eδ
∑
λ∈RΛb\{0}
e
−‖λ‖2
4σ2
b
Due to Lemma 2.3, equation (5), Pe(R)→ 0 as long as
τ2 =
1
4πσ2b
>
2c2k
λ1(RΛb)2
. (42)
The minimum distance in the received lattice is lower bounded
as follows using the arithmetic – geometric mean inequality:
λ1(RΛb)
2 = min
x∈Λb\{0}
k∑
i=1
|Rixi|2
≥ k
k∏
i=1
(
1
ρb
+ |hb,i|2
) 1
k
p(Λb)
2
k .
From the scaling condition (23), we have
p(Λb) = Np(Λb)
√
V (Λb) = Np(Λb)
√
πeP
k
ek(R+R′)/2
.
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Replacing in (42), we find that Pe(R) → 0 when k → ∞ as
long as
eR+R
′
<
Np(Λb)
2
k e
8c2
k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P
σ2b
|hb,i|2
) 1
k
.
Using the assumption (25), a sufficient condition is that
eR+R
′
<
tbe
8c2
k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P
σ2b
|hb,i|2
) 1
k
.
Recalling the hypothesis 1k
∑k
i=1 ln
(
1 + P
σ2b
|hb,i|2
)
≥ C¯b,
this concludes the proof.
2) Random channel sequence. We now consider the average
error probability for a random sequence of channels Hb =
diag(hb,1, . . . , hb,k). By the law of total probability, ∀η > 0,
Pe ≤ P
{ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P
σ2b
|hb,i|2
)1/k
< eCb−η
}
+
+ P
{
xˆ 6= x ∣∣ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P
σ2b
|hb,i|2
)1/k
≥ eCb−η
}
.
The first term vanishes when k →∞ due to the law of large
numbers (21). If the bound (25) holds, then ∀γ > 0, for
sufficiently large k, Np(Λb)
2
k > tb−γ and Np(Λe) 2k > te−γ.
Using Proposition 3.15, the second term tends to 0 if
R+R′ < Cb − η − ln
(
8c2
e
)
+ ln(tb − γ),
R′ > ln(2ec2)− ln(te − γ).
Since η, γ > 0 and c > 1√
2pi
are arbitrary, any rate
R+R′ < Cb − ln
(
4
πe
)
+ ln tb (43)
is achievable for Bob, with R′ > ln(2ec2)− ln te.
From equations (37) and (43), the proposed coding scheme
achieves strong secrecy for any message distribution (and thus
semantic security) for any secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − 2 ln
(
2
π
)
+ ln tbte.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Remark 3.16: In the conference version of this paper [1],
the error probability estimate was based on the sphere bound,
while in this paper it is based on the union bound. Both
approaches give the same gap to Bob’s capacity.
Remark 3.17: Note that in this proof we only need the one-
sided law of large numbers
lim
k→∞
P
{
1
k
k∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P
σ2b
|he,i|2
)
< Cb − δ
}
= 0.
Therefore if Alice does not know Bob’s capacity Ce but only
knows an upper bound C¯b ≤ Cb, reliability holds provided
that R+R′ < C¯b − ln
(
4
pie
)
+ ln tb.
Remark 3.18: From Remarks 3.13 and 3.17, we can con-
clude that if Alice does not know the exact capacities Cb and
Ce but is provided with a lower bound C¯b ≤ Cb and an upper
bound C¯e ≥ Ce such that (38) holds, the scheme can still
achieve strong secrecy rates R < C¯b− C¯e−2 ln
(
2
pi
)
+ln tbte.
F. Gaussian wiretap channel
Although in our proofs we used the product distance prop-
erties of the lattices Λb and Λ
∗
e, if we assume that the channels
under consideration are Gaussian, we only need to know that
the Hermite invariants of Λb and Λ
∗
e are large.
Consider the special case of the channel model (19) where
hb,i, he,i are constant and equal to 1 for all i = 1, . . . , k:{
yi = xi + wb,i,
zi = xi + we,i,
i = 1, . . . , k (44)
Proposition 3.19: Consider the wiretap scheme C(Λb,Λe)
in Section III-B, and suppose that the Hermite invariants of
Λb and Λ
∗
e (see Definition 2.11) are bounded by
lim inf
k→∞
h(Λb)
k
≥ h2b , lim inf
k→∞
h(Λ∗e)
k
≥ h2e, (45)
for some positive constants hb, he. Then the codes C(Λb,Λe)
achieve strong secrecy and semantic security if
R′ > ln
(
1 +
P
σ2e
)
+ ln
( e
π
)
− ln he,
R+R′ < ln
(
1 +
P
σ2b
)
− ln
(
4
πe
)
+ ln hb.
Thus, any strong secrecy rate
R < ln
(
1 +
P
σ2b
)
− ln
(
1 +
P
σ2e
)
− 2 ln
(
2
π
)
+ ln hbhe
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes.
The proof of Proposition 3.19 is very similar to the proof of
Theorem 3.6. A sketch is provided in Appendix G.
From the bound (18), we have hb = he = 2/ rdF for the
lattices Λb = αbΛ
(k)
F , Λe = αeΛ
(k)
F and Proposition 3.19
gives achievable rates R < ln
(
1 + P/σ2b
)− ln (1 + P/σ2e)−
2 ln(rdF /π) for the wiretap coding scheme C(ΛF , R,R′).
This is the same result that we obtain if we apply directly
Corollary 3.7. For the Martinet sequence FC of number fields,
recalling that |dF |1/2k = rdFC = G ≈ 92.368, we get a rather
large gap to capacity of 9.75 bits per complex channel use,
or 4.875 bits per real channel use, corresponding to around
30 dB (see Figure 3). Thus, a legitimate receiver with an SNR
of 35 dB could only be protected against eavesdroppers with
an SNR of 5 dB or less.
However, for general lattices the condition (45) is easier
to satisfy than the condition (25) in Theorem 3.6. Using an
analogue of the Minkowski-Hlawka theorem for inner product
spaces, Conway and Thompson showed the existence of self-
dual lattices with large Hermite invariants [61, Theorem 9.5]:
Theorem 3.20 (Conway-Thompson): For all n, there exists
a rank n self-dual lattice Λ˜n with Hermite invariant h(Λ˜n) ≥
K(n), where K(n) ∼ n2pie as n→∞.
Observe that identifying 2k-dimensional real lattices with
k-dimensional complex lattices as in (2) does not affect the
Hermite invariant and dual Hermite invariant, since duality
is defined with respect to the real inner product as in (3).
With this identification, for a wiretap scheme C(Λb,Λe) built
from the Conway-Thompson sequence of lattices Λb = αbΛ˜2k,
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Fig. 3. Achievable rate on a single-antenna Gaussian wiretap channel, where
the SNR for Eve is fixed at 5 dB.
Λe = αeΛ˜2k we have hbhe =
√
h(Λb)h(Λe)
k ∼ 1pie and applying
Proposition 3.19 we obtain achievable rates
R < ln
(
1 +
P
σ2b
)
− ln
(
1 +
P
σ2e
)
− ln 4e
π
,
i.e. a gap of 1.24 nats or 1.79 bits per complex channel use
from the secrecy capacity, or a loss of approximately 6 dB (see
Figure 3). This is slightly worse than the gap of 1/2 nat per
real channel use (or 1 nat per complex channel use) obtained in
[6] for random lattices using the Minkowski-Hlawka theorem.
On the other hand, the design criterion (45) based on the
Hermite invariant, though suboptimal, is more practical to
analyze the performance of non-random lattices.
IV. ALGEBRAIC LATTICE CONSTRUCTIONS FOR
MULTI-ANTENNA CHANNELS
In this section, we will recall the algebraic constructions
of lattice codes for multiple antenna wireless channels, which
will be needed for the wiretap coding scheme in the MIMO
case.
A. Matrix lattices
The space Mnk×n(C) is a 2n2k-dimensional real vector
space endowed with a real inner product
〈X,Y 〉 = ℜ(Tr(X†Y )), (46)
where Tr is the matrix trace. This inner product defines a
metric on the space Mnk×n(C) by setting ||X || =
√〈X,X〉.
Remark 4.1: Consider the function ξ : Mnk×n(C)→ Cn2k
which vectorizes each matrix by stacking its columns. Note
that ξ is an isometry between Mnk×n(C) with the previously
defined inner product and Cn
2k with the inner product (1).
Given H ∈Mnk×nk(C) and X ∈Mnk×n(C), we have
ξ(HX) = Hξ(X), H = H ⊗ In. (47)
Given a matrix X ∈Mnk×n(C) of the form
X =
X1...
Xk
 , (48)
we introduce the notation
Xh +
X
†
1
...
X†k
 .
We also define the product determinant as follows:
pdet(X) =
k∏
i=1
det(Xi). (49)
Remark 4.2: For X of the form (48), we have
‖X‖2=
k∑
i=1
‖Xi‖2
(a)
≥ n
k∑
i=1
|det(Xi)|
2
n
(b)
≥ nk
k∏
i=1
|det(Xi)|
2
nk = nk |pdet(X)| 2nk . (50)
Here (a) follows from the inequality ‖A‖n ≥ |det(A)| nn/2
for any A ∈ Mn(C), and (b) follows from the arithmetic –
geometric mean inequality.
Definition 4.3: A matrix lattice L ⊆ Mnk×n(C) has the
form
L = ZB1 ⊕ ZB2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ZBr,
where the matrices B1, . . . , Br are linearly independent over
R, i.e., form a lattice basis, and r is called the rank or the
dimension of the lattice.
The Gram matrix of an r-dimensional lattice L ⊂Mnk×n(C)
is defined as
Gr(L) = (〈Xi, Xj〉)1≤i,j≤r ,
where {Xi}1≤i≤r is a basis of L. The volume of the funda-
mental parallelotope of L is then given by
V (L) =
√
| det(Gr(L))|.
Definition 4.4: Given a lattice L in Mnk×n(C), the dual
lattice is defined as
L∗ = {X ∈Mnk×n(C) | ∀Y ∈ L, 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ Z}.
We also define the product determinant and normalized min-
imum determinant of the matrix lattice L ⊂ Mkn×n(C) as
follows:
pdet(L) = min
X∈L\{0}
pdet(X),
δ(L) =
pdet(L)
V (L)
1
2n
.
B. MIMO lattices from division algebras
We will first recall the construction of single-block space-
time codes from cyclic division algebras (see for example
[62]). Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to [63]
for algebraic definitions.
Definition 4.5: Let F be an algebraic number field of degree
2k and assume that E/F is a cyclic Galois extension of degree
13
n with Galois group Gal(E/F ) = 〈σ〉. We can define an
associative F -algebra
A = (E/F, σ, γ) = E ⊕ uE ⊕ u2E ⊕ · · · ⊕ un−1E,
where u ∈ A is an auxiliary generating element subject to the
relations xu = uσ(x) for all x ∈ E and un = γ ∈ F \ {0}.
We call the resulting algebra a cyclic algebra. Here F is the
center of the algebra A.
Definition 4.6: We call
√
[A : F ] the degree of the algebra
A. It is easily verified that the degree of A is equal to n.
We consider A as a right vector space over E. Every
element a = x0 + ux1 + · · · + un−1xn−1 ∈ A, with xi ∈ E
for all i = 0, . . . , n− 1, has the following representation as a
matrix:
φ(a) =

x0 γσ(xn−1) γσ2(xn−2) · · · γσn−1(x1)
x1 σ(x0) γσ
2(xn−1) γσn−1(x2)
x2 σ(x1) σ
2(x0) γσ
n−1(x3)
...
. . .
...
xn−1 σ(xn−2) σ2(xn−3) · · · σn−1(x0)

The mapping φ is called the left regular representation of
A and allows us to embed any cyclic algebra into Mn(C).
Under such an embedding φ(A) forms an 2kn2-dimensional
Q-vector space.
We are particularly interested in algebras A for which φ(a)
is invertible for all non-zero a ∈ A.
Definition 4.7: A cyclic F -algebra D is a division algebra
if every non-zero element of D is invertible.
In order to code over several fading blocks, we will next define
a multi-block lattice construction based on a cyclic division
algebra. A multi-block embedding was constructed in [64, 65]
for division algebras whose center F contains an imaginary
quadratic field. In this paper we consider a more general multi-
block embedding proposed in [66], which applies to any totally
complex center F .
Let F be totally complex of degree [F : Q] = 2k. F admits
2k Q-embeddings αi : F →֒ C in complex conjugate pairs:
αi = αi+k , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Each αi can be extended to
an embedding E →֒ C. Given a ∈ D, consider the mapping
ψ : D 7→Mnk×n(C) given by
ψ(a) =
α1(φ(a))...
αk(φ(a))
 , (51)
where each αi is extended to an embedding αi : Mn(E) →֒
Mn(C).
Remark 4.8: For all x ∈ D,
pdet(ψ(a)) =
k∏
i=1
det(αi(φ(a)))
(a)
=
k∏
i=1
αi(det(φ(a)))
(b)
= (NF/Q(ND/F (a)))
1
2 = (ND/Q(a))
1
2 , (52)
where (a) follows from the fact that the αi are ring homo-
morphisms, and (b) follows from the definition of the reduced
norm.
In order to obtain a matrix lattice, we will consider a suitable
discrete subset of the algebra called an order.
Definition 4.9: A Z-order Γ in D is a subring of D having
the same identity element as D, and such that Γ is a finitely
generated module over Z which generates D as a linear space
over Q.
The following result was proven in [66, Proposition 5]:
Proposition 4.10: Let Γ be a Z-order in D and ψ the previ-
ously defined embedding. Then ψ(Γ) is a 2kn2-dimensional
lattice in Mnk×n(C) which satisfies
min
a∈Γ\{0}
|pdet(ψ(a))| = 1, V (ψ(Γ)) = 2−kn2
√
|d(Γ/Z)|.
Here d(Γ/Z) is a non-zero integer called the Z-discriminant
of the order Γ. We refer the reader to [63] for the relevant
definitions.
C. Dual lattice and codifferent
Let Γ be a Z-order in D. We define the codifferent of Γ as
Γ∨ = {x ∈ D : trD/Q(xΓ) ⊆ Z},
where trD/Q is the reduced trace.
The codifferent is an ideal of D, and its reduced norm is
related to the discriminant as follows [63]:
ND/Q(Γ∨) =
1
d(Γ/Z)
1
n
. (53)
Similarly to the commutative case, the codifferent of Γ
embeds as the complex conjugate of the dual lattice.
Lemma 4.11: ψ(Γ)∗ = 2ψ(Γ∨)h.
This Lemma is proven in Appendix E.
D. Orders with small discriminants and dense matrix lattices
A family of division algebras with orders having particularly
small discriminants was constructed in [43]. These orders yield
dense lattices as shown in Proposition 4.10.
First, we need the following Theorem [67, Theorem 6.14]:
Theorem 4.12: Let F be a number field of degree 2k and P1
and P2 be two prime ideals of F . Then there exists a degree
n division algebra D having an order Γ with discriminant
d(Γ/Z) = (NF/Q(P1)NF/Q(P2))
n(n−1)(dF )n
2
. (54)
Thanks to this property, a suitable family of division alge-
bras can be chosen in two steps.
First, we should choose an infinite sequence of centers {Fk}
with small discriminants, such as Martinet’s sequence FC
(Theorem 2.8). Furthermore, one can choose suitable ideals
in these number fields [43, Lemma 7.9]:
Lemma 4.13: Every number field Fk in the Martinet family
has ideals P1 and P2 such that
NF/Q(P1) ≤ 23k/10 and NF/Q(P2) ≤ 23k/10.
This leads us to the main result in [43]:
Theorem 4.14: Given n, there exists a sequence of totally
complex number fields {Fk} of degree 2k and a sequence of
division algebras Dk of index n over Fk having an order Γk
with discriminant
d(Γk/Z) ≤ β2kn(n−1)G2kn2 ,
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where G = rdFC ≈ 92.368 and β = 23 110 . Consequently,
{Λ(n,k)} = {ψ(Γk)} is a sequence of 2n2k-dimensional
lattices with
pdet(Λ(n,k)) = 1, V (Λ(n,k)) ≤ βkn(n−1)
(
G
2
)n2k
.
E. Flatness factor of multi-block matrix lattices from division
algebras
Remark 4.15: Due to the isometry ξ between Mnk×n(C)
and Cn
2k (Remark 4.1), the definitions of flatness factor,
smoothing parameter and discrete Gaussian distribution extend
in a natural way for matrix lattices in Mnk×n(C).
Given a lattice Λ ⊂ Mnk×n(C), a multi-block matrix X¯ ∈
Mnk×n(C) and a positive definite matrix Σ ∈ Mnk×nk(C),
we define
ǫΛ(
√
Σ) + ǫξ(Λ)(
√
Σ⊗ In),
ηε(Λ) + ηε(ξ(Λ)),
DΛ−X¯,Σ(X − X¯) + Dξ(Λ−X¯),Σ⊗In(ξ(X − X¯)) ∀X ∈ Λ.
Note that these definitions are consistent with the previous
ones: for example,
ǫ√Σ−1Λ(I) = ǫξ(
√
Σ−1Λ)(I) = ǫ(
√
Σ⊗In)−1ξ(Λ)(I)
= ǫξ(Λ)(
√
Σ⊗ I) = ǫΛ(
√
Σ).
We now focus on the sequence of n2k-dimensional multi-
block matrix lattices Λ(n,k) = ψ(Γk) ⊂ Mnk×n(C) in
Theorem 4.14.
Let c > 1√
2pi
, C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
, ε = C
2n2k
1−C2n2k .
From (6) and Lemma 4.11, we obtain
ηε(Λ
(n,k)) ≤ n
√
kc
λ1(ψ(Γ∨k )h)
. (55)
V. MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. Channel model
We consider a MIMO fading channel model where Alice is
equipped with n antennas, while Bob and Eve have nb and
ne antennas respectively. In this paper, we always assume that
nb ≥ n and ne ≥ n.
Transmission takes place over k quasi-static fading blocks of
delay T = n, and the transmitted codeword is of the form
(48), where the matrix Xi ∈ Mn(C) is sent during the i-th
block.
The outputs Y and Z at Bob and Eve’s end respectively are
given by {
Y = HbX +Wb,
Z = HeX +We,
(56)
where the channel matrices Hb = diag(Hb,1, . . . , Hb,k) ∈
Mnbk×nk(C), He = diag(He,1, . . . , He,k) ∈ Mnek×nk(C)
are (possibly rectangular) block diagonal matrices. The co-
efficients of the noise matrices Wb and We are i.i.d. circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ2b ,
σ2e per complex dimension. The input X satisfies the average
power constraint (per channel use)
1
nk
k∑
i=1
‖Xi‖2 ≤ P. (57)
The average power per symbol is σ2s =
P
n . We denote by
ρb =
σ2s
σ2b
and ρe =
σ2s
σ2e
the signal-to-noise ratios for Bob and
Eve respectively.
We suppose that {Hb,i}, {He,i} are isotropically invariant
channels such that the channel capacities Cb and Ce are well-
defined and ∀γ, γ′ > 0,
lim
k→∞
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln det
(
Inb+ρbH
†
b,iHb,i
)
−Cb
∣∣∣∣∣> γ
}
= 0 (58)
lim
k→∞
k P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln det
(
Ine+ρeH
†
e,iHe,i
)
−Ce
∣∣∣∣∣>γ′
}
=0 (59)
We suppose that Alice has no instantaneous CSI, Bob has
perfect CSI of his own channel, and Eve has perfect CSI of
her channel and of Bob’s.
Similarly to the single-antenna case, condition (58) is satisfied
for static channels, i.i.d. fading channels and i.i.d. block fading
channels, and all ergodic channels; condition (59) is more
restrictive and holds for static, i.i.d. fading and block fading
models, and ergodic channels for which the convergence in
the law of large numbers is faster than 1k .
Recall that in the ergodic case with no instantaneous CSIT,
where the transmitter uses uniform power allocation, the
white-input capacities of Bob and Eve’s channels are given
by
Cb = EH¯b
[
ln det
(
Inb +
ρb
n
H¯bH¯
†
b
)]
,
Ce = EH¯e
[
ln det
(
Ine +
ρe
n
H¯eH¯
†
e
)]
,
where H¯b ∈ Mnb×n(C) and H¯e ∈ Mne×n(C) are random
matrices with the same first order distribution as the processes
{Hb,i},{He,i}.
A confidential message M and an auxiliary message M ′
with rate R and R′ respectively are encoded into the multi-
block codeword X .
As in the single-antenna case (Remark 3.3), we have that
I(M ;Z|Hb, He) = I(M ;Z|He), i.e. the leakage is given by
I(M ;Z|He).
Remark 5.1: For general channels the strong secrecy capac-
ity is not known in this setting (see Remark 3.4 for the SISO
case). In [19] it was shown that the weak secrecy capacity
Cws = Cb − Ce
for i.i.d. fading wiretap channels such that Bob and Eve’s
fadings are independent.
B. Multi-block lattice wiretap coding
Let Λe ⊂ Λb be a pair of nested multiblock matrix lattices
in Mnk×n(C) such that Λe ⊂ Λb and |Λb/Λe| = enkR, with
volumes scaling as follows:
V (Λe) =
(πeσ2s )
n2k
enkR′
, V (Λb) =
(πeσ2s )
n2k
enk(R+R′)
, (60)
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where R′ > 0. Each message m ∈ M = {1, . . . , enkR} is
mapped to a coset leader X(m) ∈ Λb ∩R(Λe), where R(Λe)
is a fundamental region of Λe. In order to transmit the message
m, Alice samples X from the discrete Gaussian DΛe+X(m),σs
where σ2s =
P
n . We denote this coding scheme by C(Λb,Λe).
Similarly to Remark 3.5, it follows from [6, Lemma 6 and
Remark 6] that ∀ 0 < t < π, for θt = pi−tpi , if εk =
ǫ
Λ
(k)
e
(
√
θtσs) < 1,∣∣∣E[‖X‖2]− n2kσ2s ∣∣∣ ≤ 2πεk1− εk σ2s .
As k → ∞, the variance per complex dimension of X tends
to σ2s provided that
lim
k→∞
ǫ
Λ
(k)
e
(
√
θtσs) = 0, (61)
and the power constraint (57) is verified asymptotically. From
[6, Lemma 7 and Remark 7], the information rate per complex
symbol of the auxiliary message is bounded by∣∣∣∣H(M ′)n −
(
ln(πeσ2s )−
1
n2k
lnV (Λe)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ νt(εk),
where νt(ǫk) → 0 as ǫk → 0. If ǫk → 0, the entropy rate of
the auxiliary message tends to R′.
Coding scheme based on division algebras with constant
root discriminant. Let {Λ(n,k)} = {ψ(Γk)} be the sequence
of n2k-dimensional multi-block matrix lattices in Mnk×n(C)
from Theorem 4.14. We consider scaled versions Λb =
αbΛ
(n,k), Λe = αeΛ
(n,k) such that Λe ⊂ Λb and |Λb/Λe| =
enkR. Given rates R,R′, we denote the corresponding multi-
block lattice coding scheme by C(Λ(n,k), R,R′).
C. Achievable secrecy rates
We now state the main result for MIMO wiretap channels,
which will be proven in Sections V-D and V-E.
Theorem 5.2: Consider the multi-block wiretap coding
scheme C(Λb,Λe) in Section V-B, and suppose that
lim inf
k→∞
δ(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ de, lim inf
k→∞
δ(Λb)
2
k ≥ db (62)
for some positive constants de, db.
If the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel verify the
conditions (58) and (59) respectively, then C(Λb,Λe) achieves
strong secrecy for any message distribution pM (and thus
semantic security) if
R′ > Ce + n ln
(ne
π
)
− ln de, (63)
R+R′ < Cb − n ln
(
4n
πe
)
+ ln db. (64)
Thus, any strong secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − 2n ln
(
2n
π
)
+ ln dbde (65)
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes.
Corollary 5.3: If the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel verify the conditions (58) and (59) respectively,
then the multi-block wiretap coding scheme C(Λ(n,k), R,R′)
achieves strong secrecy and semantic security if
R′ > Ce + n ln
(
neβ
n−1
n G
2π
)
,
R+R′ < Cb − n ln
(
2nβ
n−1
n G
πe
)
,
where G = rdFC ≈ 92.368. Thus, any strong secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − 2n ln
(
nGβ
n−1
n
π
)
is achievable with the proposed lattice codes.
Proof of the Corollary: From Theorem 4.14 we get
δ(Λb)
2
k = δ(Λ(n,k))
2
k =
2n
β(n−1)Gn
On the other side, for the dual lattice we have
pdet((Λ(n,k))∗)
(a)
=
√
ND/Q(2ψ(Γ∨k )
(b)
=
1
d(Γk/Z)
1
2n
(c)
=
2nk
βk(n−1)Gkn
,
where (a) follows from (52), (b) follows from (53) and (c)
from Theorem 4.14. The normalized minimum determinant of
Λ∗e is
δ(Λ∗e) = δ((Λ
(n,k))∗) =
pdet((Λ(n,k))∗)
V ((Λ(n,k))∗)
1
2n
= pdet((Λ(n,k))∗)V (Λ(n,k))
1
n =
2
kn
2
β
k(n−1)
2 G
kn2
2
,
and so we find that
δ(Λ∗e)
2
k =
2n
β(n−1)Gn
.
Remark 5.4: Let S(Cb, Ce) denote the set of all ergodic
stationary isotropically invariant fading processes {(Hb, He)}
such that (58) and (59) hold. Similarly to the single antenna
case, a fixed lattice code sequence C(Λ(n,k), R,R′) with rates
satisfying (63) and (64) universally achieves strong secrecy
and semantic security over all channels in the set S(C′b, C′e)
for all C′b ≥ Cb and for all C′e ≤ Ce.
Finally, the condition (59) can be relaxed if only weak
secrecy is required:
Proposition 5.5: If the condition (58) holds for the main
channel and ∀γ′ > 0 we have
lim
k→∞
P
{∣∣∣∣∣1k
k∑
i=1
ln det
(
I + ρeH
†
e,iHe,i
)
− Ce
∣∣∣∣∣ > γ′
}
= 0
for the eavesdropper’s channel, then the wiretap coding
scheme C(Λb,Λe) achieves weak secrecy if conditions (62),
(63) and (64) hold. In particular, any weak secrecy rate
R < Cb−Ce−2n ln
(
nGβ(n−1)
pi
)
is achievable with the lattice
codes C(Λ(n,k), R,R′).
The proof of Proposition 5.5 is very similar to the proof of
Theorem 5.2 and is omitted.
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D. Proof of Theorem 5.2: Secrecy
The proof follows the same steps as in the single antenna
case (Section III-D).
1) Fixed channel. First, we prove an upper bound for the
finite-length leakage when the eavesdropper’s channel He is
fixed.
Proposition 5.6 (Bound for the leakage): Suppose that
δ(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ de for the 2n2k-dimensional lattice Λe, and that
He is fixed and such that
1
k
∑k
i=1 ln det(I + ρeH
†
eHe) ≤ C¯e.
Then if R′ > C¯e− ln de+2n ln(c
√
2ne), for sufficiently large
k ≥ k¯(c), the leakage is bounded by
I(pM ; pZ|He) ≤ 8n2kεkR− 8εk ln 8εk, (66)
where εk =
C2n
2k
1−C2n2k , and C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
.
Proof: We distinguish two cases: the symmetric case
(ne = n) and the asymmetric case (ne > n).
a) Case ne = n. The received signal at Eve’s end is
Z = HeX + We. As in equation (29), the leakage can be
written as
I(M ;Z,He) = EHe
[
I(pM ; pZ|He)
]
For a fixed realization He = diag(He,1, . . . , He,k), we have
HeX ∼ D
HeΛe+HeX(m),
√
HeH
†
eσs
,
recalling the notation in Remark 4.15. Using Lemma 2.4 with
Σ1 = HeH
†
eσ
2
s , Σ2 = σ
2
eInk, we have
V(pZ|He,M=m, f√Σ0) ≤ 4εk (67)
provided that
ǫHeΛe(
√
Σ) = ǫ√
Σ
−1
HeΛe
(1) ≤ εk ≤ 1
2
, (68)
where we define Σ0 = HeH
†
eσ
2
s + σ
2
eInk, Σ
−1 =
(HeH
†
e )
−1
σ2s
+ Inkσ2e
. Note that Σ = σ2sσ
2
e(σ
2
eInk +
σ2sHeH
†
e )
−1HeH†e .
Using (6), for εk =
C2n
2k
1−C2n2k , the smoothing parameter of
the faded lattice is upper bounded by
ηεk(
√
Σ−1HeΛe) ≤ 2cn
√
k
λ1(
√
Σ(H†e )−1(Λe)∗)
. (69)
Using Remark 4.2, we find
λ1(
√
Σ(H†e )
−1Λ∗e) ≥ nk
k∏
i=1
(σ2s )
1
k pdet(Λ∗e)
2
nk
det(I+ ρeHe,iH
†
e,i)
1
nk
Replacing in the bound (69), we have
ηεk(
√
Σ−1HeΛe)≤ 2c
√
n
pdet(Λ∗e)
1
nk σs
k∏
i=1
det
(
I+ ρeHe,iH
†
e,i
)
1
2nk
≤ 2c
√
n
pdet(Λ∗e)
1
nk σs
e
C¯e
2n .
Suppose that
1√
2π
2c
√
ne
C¯e
2n
pdet(Λ∗e)
1
nk σs
≤ 1. (70)
Then (68) holds for sufficiently large k (depending only on
c), and it follows from [6, Lemma 2] that
I(pM ; pZ|He) ≤ 8n2kεkR− 8εk ln 8εk.
Recalling the definition of normalized minimum determi-
nant and the scaling condition (60),
pdet(Λ∗e)
1
nk =
(
δ(Λ∗e)V (Λ
∗
e)
1
2n
) 1
nk
=
δ(Λ∗e)
1
nk
V (Λe)
1
2n2k
=
δ(Λ∗e)
1
nk e
R′
2n√
πeσs
.
In particular if δ(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ de, the sufficient condition (70)
for secrecy is satisfied if
R′ > C¯e + 2n ln(c
√
2ne)− ln de.
b) Case ne > n. As before, the received signal is Z =
HeX + We ∈ HeΛe + HeX(m) + We. If He is full rank,
the lattice HeΛe is a 2n
2k-dimensional lattice contained in a
2nnek-dimensional space. Consider the QR decomposition
He = QeRe
where Qe ∈ Mnek×nk(C) is unitary and Re ∈ Mnk×nk(C)
is upper triangular. We have Qe = [Q
′
eQ
′′
e ], where Q
′
e ∈
Mnek×nk(C) is such that (Q
′
e)
†Q′e = Ink, and Re =
[
R′e
0
]
,
R′e = diag(R
′
e,1, . . . , R
′
e,k) ∈Mnk×nk(C). Multiplying Eve’s
channel equation in (56) by Q†e, we obtain
Q†eZ = ReX +Q
†
eWe =
[
R′eX + (Q
′
e)
†We
(Q′′e )
†We
]
=
[
Z ′
Z ′′
]
Therefore, the second component is pure noise and contains
no information about the message. Since Q′e is unitary, W
′
e =
(Q′e)
†We has the same distribution as We and is independent
of X and He. Consequently, we can rewrite the leakage as
I(M ;Z|He) = I(M ;Z ′|He) = I(M ;Z ′|R′e).
The rest of the proof then proceeds exactly as in the case
ne = n, by replacing Z with Z
′ and He with R′e. Observe
that H†eHe = (R
′
e)
†R′e and so
k∏
i=1
det
(
I + ρe(R
′
e,i)
†R′e,i
) 1
k = det
(
I + ρe(R
′
e)
†R′e
) 1
k
= det
(
I+ρe(He)
†He
) 1
k =
k∏
i=1
det
(
I+ρe(He,i)
†He,i
) 1
k .
2) Random channel. Thanks to Proposition 5.6, we can now
bound the average leakage for random fading He when k →
∞. Due to the law of large numbers (59), ∀η > 0
P
{
k∏
i=1
det
(
I + ρeHe,iH
†
e,i
) 1
k
> eCe+η
}
→ 0.
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The average leakage is bounded as follows:
EHe
[
I(pM ; pZ|He)
] ≤
≤ P
{ k∏
i=1
det
(
I + ρeHe,iH
†
e,i
) 1
k
> eCe+η
}
(n2kR)+
+ EHe
[
I(pM ; pZ|He)
∣∣∣ k∏
i=1
det
(
I+ρeHe,iH
†
e,i
) 1
k≤ eCe+η
]
(71)
The first term vanishes when k → ∞ due to the condition
(59).
If the bound (62) holds, then ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently large
k, δ(Λ∗e)
2
k > de − γ. Using Proposition 5.6, the second term
in (71) tends to zero when k → ∞ and the scheme achieves
strong secrecy provided that
R′ > Ce + η + 2n ln(c
√
2ne)− ln(de − γ).
Since η, γ > 0 and c > 1√
2pi
are arbitrary, any rate
R′ > Ce + n ln
(ne
π
)
− ln de (72)
is sufficient for strong secrecy.
3) Power constraint and entropy of auxiliary message. We
still need to check that the flatness factor condition (61) holds,
so that the power constraint is verified asymptotically and R′
is the rate of the auxiliary message.
Proposition 5.7 (Bound for the flatness factor): Suppose
that the δ(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ de for the 2n2k dimensional lattice Λe. Let
0 < t < π and θt =
pi−t
pi . If R
′ ≥ n ln(2nec2)−ln de−n ln θt,
then ǫΛe(
√
θtσs) ≤ εk = C2n
2k
1−C2n2k , where C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
.
Proof: Using Remark 4.2, we have
λ1(Λ
∗
e) ≥
√
nk pdet(Λ∗e)
1
nk =
√
nkδ(Λ∗e)
1
nk e
R′
2n√
πeσs
≥
√
nkd
1
2n
e e
R′
2n√
πeσs
.
Then for εk =
C2n
2k
1−C2n2k we have
ηεk(Λe) ≤
2cn
√
k
λ1(Λ∗e)
≤ 2c
√
nπeσs
d
1
2n
e e
R′
2n
Therefore ǫΛe(σs) ≤ εk
provided that √
θtσs ≥ 2c
√
n
√
πeσs
d
1
2n
e e
R′
2n
√
2π
or equivalently R′ ≥ n ln(2nec2)− ln de−n ln θt, as desired.
In particular when c→ 1√
2pi
and t→ 0, θt → 1, we obtain
the condition
R′ > n ln
(ne
π
)
− ln de, (73)
which is weaker than (72).
E. Proof of Theorem 5.2: Reliability
Recall that the received signal at Bob is Y = HbX +Wb.
1) Fixed channel. First of all, we prove the following
uniform upper bound for the finite-length error probability of
the code in the case of a fixed channel realization Hb:
Proposition 5.8 (Bound for the error probability): Sup-
pose that δ(Λb)
2
k ≥ db, δ(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ de for the 2n2k-
dimensional lattices Λb and Λe, and that Hb is fixed with
1
k
∑k
i=1 ln det(I + ρbH
†
b,iHb,i) ≥ C¯b. Then for code rates
R+R′ < C¯b−n ln
(
8c2n
e
)
+ln db, R
′ ≥ n ln (2nec2)− ln de,
the ML error probability for Bob is bounded by
Pe ≤ 1 + εk
1− εk εk,
where εk =
C2n
2k
1−C2n2k and C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
.
Proof: Let ρb =
σ2s
σ2
b
, and consider the “thin” QR decom-
position
H˜b =
(
Hb
1√
ρb
Ink
)
= QRb =
(
Q1
Q2
)
Rb,
where H˜b, Q ∈ Mk(nb+n)×kn(C), Q1 ∈ Mknb×kn(C). Note
that Q has orthonormal columns, Rb ∈ Mkn(C) is upper
triangular and square block-diagonal, and
R†bRb = H˜
†
b H˜b = H
†
bHb +
1
ρb
I.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the vectorized version
of the received message: let x = ξ(X), y = ξ(Y ), wb =
ξ(Wb). Then
y = Hbx+wb,
where Hb = Hb ⊗ In. Note that if we set Q1 = Q1 ⊗ In,
R = Rb ⊗ In, we also have Hb = Q1R.
Similarly to the single antenna case (Section III-E), Bob can
compute
y′ = Q†1y = Rx+ v,
where v = Q†1wb − 1ρb (R−1)†x [60].
Recall that x is sampled from Dξ(Λe)+ξ(X(m)),σs . Using
Lemma 2.7, x is δk-subgaussian with parameter σs for
δk = ln
(
1+εk
1−εk
)
provided that ǫΛe(σs) ≤ εk < 1, which is
guaranteed by Proposition 5.7. With the same argument as
in Section III-E, we can show that the equivalent noise v is
δk-subgaussian with parameter σb.
Following the same steps as in Section III-E, we have the
union bound on the error probability for fixed R:
Pe(R) ≤ eδk
∑
λ∈RΛb\{0}
e
−‖λ‖2
4σ2
b =
1 + εk
1− εk
∑
λ∈RΛb\{0}
e
− ‖λ‖2
4σ2
b .
Using Lemma 2.3, Pe(R) ≤ 1+εk1−εk εk if
τ2 =
1
4πσ2b
>
2c2n2k
λ1(RΛb)2 . (74)
The minimum distance in the received lattice is lower bounded
as follows:
λ1(RΛb)2 = min
X¯∈Λb\{0}
∥∥Rξ(X¯)∥∥2 = min
X¯∈Λb\{0}
∥∥RbX¯∥∥2
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(a)
≥ min
X¯∈Λb\{0}
nk
k∏
i=1
∣∣det(Rb,iX¯i)∣∣ 2nk
= min
X¯∈Λb\{0}
nk
k∏
i=1
∣∣∣det(H˜†b,iH˜b,i)∣∣∣ 1nk k∏
i=1
∣∣det X¯i∣∣ 2nk
= nk
k∏
i=1
∣∣∣det(H˜†b,iH˜b,i)∣∣∣ 1nk pdet(Λb) 2nk ,
where (a) follows from Remark 4.2. From the scaling condi-
tion (60), we get
pdet(Λb)
2
nk =
δ(Λb)
2
nk πeσ2s
e
R+R′
n
.
Replacing in the condition (74), we have that Pe(R) ≤ 1+εk1−εk εk
if
e
R+R′
n <
k∏
i=1
det
(
In
ρb
+H†b,iHb,i
) 1
nk δ(Λb)
2
nk eσ2s
8c2nσ2b
.
In particular, recalling the assumption δ(Λb)
2
k ≥ db, a suffi-
cient condition is
e
R+R′
n <
k∏
i=1
det
(
In + ρbH
†
b,iHb,i
) 1
nk d
1
n
b e
8c2n
.
or equivalently R+R′ < C¯b − n ln
(
8c2n
e
)
+ ln db.
2) Random channel. Using the previous proposition, we
now consider the behavior of the error probability for random
channels Hb when k → ∞. By the law of total probability,
∀η > 0,
Pe ≤ P
{ k∏
i=1
det
(
I + ρbH
†
b,iHb,i
)1/nk
< e
Cb−η
n
}
+ P
{
xˆ 6= x ∣∣ k∏
i=1
det
(
I + ρbH
†
b,iHb,i
)1/nk
≥ eCb−ηn
}
.
Due to the law of large numbers (58), the first term vanishes
when k →∞.
If (62) holds, then ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently large k, we have
δ(Λb)
2
k ≥ db − γ, δ(Λe) 2k ≥ de − γ. Then using Proposition
5.8, the error probability in the second term tends to 0 if
R+R′ < Cb − η − n ln
(
8c2n
e
)
+ ln(db − γ) (75)
where R′ > n ln(2nec2)− ln(de − γ).
Since η, γ > 0 and c > 1√
2pi
are arbitrary, from equations
(72) and (75), the proposed coding scheme achieves strong
secrecy and semantic security rates
R < Cb − Ce − 2n ln
(
2n
π
)
+ ln dbde.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.2.
VI. COMPOUND MIMO CHANNEL
In this section, instead of assuming that fading is distributed
according to a certain probability density function, we consider
a setting where the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel
are unknown at the transmitter and are only known to belong
to a certain uncertainty set S.
As in Section V-A, we consider a MIMO wiretap channel
where Alice has n antennas, and Bob and Eve have nb and ne
antennas respectively. The received signals at Bob and Eve’s
end are given by {
Y = HbX +Wb,
Z = HeX +We,
where Hb = diag(Hb,1, . . . , Hb,k) ∈ Mnbk×nk(C), He =
diag(He,1, . . . , He,k) ∈ Mnek×nk(C), Wb and We have i.i.d.
Gaussian entries with zero mean and variance σ2b , σ
2
e , and
X satisfies the average power constraint (57). As before, the
average power per symbol is σ2s =
P
n , and ρb =
σ2s
σ2b
and
ρe =
σ2s
σ2e
are the signal-to-noise ratios for Bob and Eve.
We suppose that Bob has perfect CSI of his own channel, Eve
has perfect CSI of both channels, and Alice only knows that
(Hb, He) ∈ S, where S is the uncertainty set.
We say that a coding scheme achieves strong secrecy if
∀(Hb, He) ∈ S,
Pe,k = sup
(Hb,He)∈S
max
m∈M
P
{
Mˆ 6= m|Hb, He,M = m
}
→ 0,
Lk = sup
(Hb,He)∈S
I(M ;Z,He)→ 0
as k →∞.
Compound channel model. In this model the channels are
assumed to be held constant during transmission, i.e. Hb,i =
H¯b ∈ Mnb×n(C), He,i = H¯e ∈ Mne×n(C) ∀i = 1, . . . , k,
and (H¯b, H¯e) ∈ S¯ ⊆ S¯b × S¯e, where
S¯b =
{
H¯b ∈Mnb×n : ln det(I + ρbH¯bH¯†b ) ≥ Cb
}
,
S¯e =
{
H¯e ∈Mne×n : ln det(I + ρeH¯eH¯†e ) ≤ Ce
}
.
for some 0 ≤ Ce ≤ Cb.
Note that in this model, Eve’s channel is not necessarily
degraded with respect to Bob’s channel.
Remark 6.1: The compound secrecy capacity for an uncer-
tainty set S¯ ⊆ S¯b × S¯e is not known in general, but has been
computed in some special cases in [68]. In particular if S¯
is compact, it follows from [68, Corollary 2] that the (strong)
compound secrecy capacity is lower bounded as Cc ≥ Cb−Ce.
Arbitrarily varying channel model. In this model, the real-
izations {Hb,i} and {He,i} may change at each channel use in
an arbitrary and unknown way [69], and (Hb, He) ∈ S(k) =
S(k)b × S(k)e , where
S(k)b =
{
Hb∈Mnbk×nk :
1
k
k∑
i=1
ln det(I+ρbHb,iH
†
b,i) ≥ Cb
}
,
S(k)e =
{
He∈Mnek×nk :
1
k
k∑
i=1
ln det(I+ρeHe,iH
†
e,i) ≤ Ce
}
.
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Theorem 6.2: Consider the multi-block wiretap coding
scheme C(Λb,Λe) in Section V-B, and suppose that ∀k,
lim infk→∞ δ(Λb)
2
k ≥ db, lim infk→∞ δ(Λ∗e)
2
k ≥ de. Then
any strong secrecy rate
R < Cb − Ce − 2n ln
(
2n
π
)
+ ln dbde
is achievable both over the compound MIMO channel with
uncertainty set S¯ ⊆ S¯b × S¯e and over the arbitrarily varying
MIMO channel with uncertainty set S(k) ⊆ S(k)b × S(k)e .
Proof: Let c > 1√
2pi
be a fixed parameter. Note that ∀γ >
0, for sufficiently large k, we have δ(Λb)
2
k > db−γ, δ(Λe) 2k >
de − γ.
Secrecy. It follows from Proposition 5.6 that as long as
R′ > Ce − ln(de − γ) + 2n ln(c
√
2ne), for sufficiently large
k ≥ k¯(c), for all channels He ∈ S(k)e , the leakage is uniformly
bounded by I(pM ; pZ|He) ≤ 8n2kεkR − 8εk ln 8εk, where
εk =
C2n
2k
1−C2n2k , and C = c
√
2πee−pic
2
.
Reliability. It follows from Proposition 5.8 that as long as
R + R′ < Cb − n ln
(
8c2n
e
)
+ ln(db − γ), for all channels
Hb ∈ S(k)b , the ML error probability for Bob is uniformly
bounded by Pe ≤ 1+εk1−εk εk.
Since the previous rates are achievable for all c >
1√
2pi
, ∀γ > 0, this concludes the proof.
VII. CODE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR FADING AND MIMO
WIRETAP CHANNELS
We will now discuss the implications of our results in terms
of design of wiretap lattice codes.
A. Single antenna fading and Gaussian wiretap channels
Although in Corollary 3.7 we focused on a particular
sequence of nested lattices Λe ⊂ Λb that were scaled versions
of the same lattice Λ(k), Theorem 3.6 suggests a more general
design criterion for building promising lattice codes for fading
channels. Namely, we should consider pairs of nested lattices
Λe ⊂ Λb for which the product
Np(Λb)Np(Λ
∗
e)
is maximized. As shown earlier, ideals from number fields
with small discriminants give us promising candidates.
Here the term tb = Np(Λb)
2
k can be seen as providing
reliability for the communication between Alice and Bob while
te = Np(Λ
∗
e)
2
k provides security against the wiretapper.
While we mainly targeted general fading channels in this
work, we also gained some intuition on code design in
Gaussian wiretap channels. Proposition 3.19 suggests that in
the Gaussian case one should maximize the product of the
Hermite invariants
h(Λb)h(Λ
∗
e). (76)
Rather than using number field lattices, in this particular
case one might optimize (76) for example by considering the
densest self dual lattices.
B. Code design for MIMO wiretap channels
An analogous code design criterion can be given also in
the MIMO case using the concept of normalized minimum
determinant δ(Λ) of a matrix lattice, which was defined in
Section IV-A.
Using this concept, Theorem 5.2 suggests that for MIMO
channels we should maximize δ(Λ∗e)δ(Λb).
C. Comparison with earlier code design
The earliest work on lattice code design for the AWGN
channel is based on an error probability approach [32]. The
main criterion for maximizing the confusion of the eavesdrop-
per is that the theta function of Λe should be minimized.
As this function is hard to analyze, the authors discussed a
simplified criterion where one should maximize the Hermite
invariant of Λe [32, eq. (48)].
In comparison, our criterion differs in two ways. First, we
prove that following our design principles the information
leakage will be minimized. Second, our study emphasizes that
the code design criterion for secrecy should be stated in terms
of Λ∗e and not of Λe.
The work [6] concentrates on achieving strong secrecy
over the Gaussian wiretap channel. Its results suggest that
the theta function of Λ∗e should be minimized for secrecy.
Maximizing the Hermite invariant of Λ∗e can be seen as a
first-order approximation of this criterion, which we now
make rigorous in Proposition 3.19. When considering random
lattices, this first order approximation yields slightly worse
achievable strong secrecy rates (1.24 nats per complex channel
use from secrecy capacity, versus 1 nat per complex channel
use in [6], see Section III-F).
Lattice code design for the fading wiretap channel was pi-
oneered in [33] and [34] where the error probability approach
led the authors to consider certain inverse determinant sums
over the lattice Λe; both of these works suggest the use of
number fields for wiretap coding. Similar conditions were
derived also in [38, 70] to minimize the information leakage.
Compared to earlier works on fading wiretap channels, our
criterion is the first which guarantees positive strong secrecy
rates, in the sense that we prove that by maximizing Np(Λ∗e)
or δ(Λ∗e) one can indeed push the leaked information to zero.
Also similarly to the Gaussian case it seems to be better to
state the design criterion for Λ∗e instead of Λe.
Remark 7.1: We point out that in the derivation of the code
design criterion for Λe in [32, p. 5706] the authors first obtain
a condition for the theta function of Λ∗e and only after using
Poisson summation they end up with a condition for Λe. So
the authors could also have stated their criterion for Λ∗e .
Obviously for lattices that are isodual or even self-dual it is
irrelevant whether the condition is given for Λe or for Λ
∗
e. It is
interesting to note that the authors in [32] were concentrating
on the analysis of iso-dual or self dual lattices with large
Hermite invariants. For such lattices our criterion agrees with
theirs. In the fading case, [33] and [34] focused on number
field and division algebra lattices. Therefore their code design
principles automatically lead to lattices for which δ(Λ∗e) is non
zero.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this work, we have shown that algebraic lattice construc-
tions based on number fields and division algebras can achieve
strong secrecy and semantic security universally over a wide
range of fading and MIMO wiretap channels. Universality is
a very desirable property for practical applications, since the
eavesdropper’s channel is not known at the transmitter.
Relevance and limitations of the channel model. Our
model assumes perfect CSI of the legitimate channel at the
receiver. This assumption is not realistic for a fast fading
channel, since in practice most of the available time slots
would have to be used to transmit training symbols for channel
estimation.
However, our channel model is not limited to fast fading,
but only assumes the weak law of large numbers for the
channel statistics. This includes for example a block fading
model, where some fraction of each block can be used for
channel estimation and the rest is left for data transmission.
We have also provided some results for the arbitrarily varying
fading model in Section VI, where Bob’s channel oscillates
most of the time above a certain threshold and Eve’s channel
oscillates mostly below another threshold, without necessarily
converging in mean.
In such slow fading models a long code spanning many
fading blocks is required to approach capacity. Our codes
readily work in such a scenario due to their universality;
decoding will succeed as long as the sum capacity of the fading
blocks exceeds the target rate (up to a constant gap).
We also note that even in the stationary ergodic case we
require fast convergence in the law of large numbers only
for the eavesdropper, while the rate of convergence can be
slower for the legitimate channel. Here perfect CSI at the
eavesdropper is assumed as a worst-case scenario.
A more realistic wiretap channel model with imperfect CSI
at the receiver under a secrecy outage metric is left for future
work.
Technical improvements. Several technical improvements
are needed before our lattice code construction can be im-
plemented in practice. In particular, although the proposed
families of lattices are deterministic, their construction is not
explicit since it requires the computation of Hilbert class fields
of high degree, for which efficient algorithms are currently not
available.
Moreover, our construction incurs a large gap to the secrecy
capacity. This gap might be reduced by improving the nested
lattice construction, for example by taking suitable ideals of
the ring of integers in the number field case10, or ideals of
orders in the division algebra case, in order to optimize the
code design according to the criteria proposed in Section VII.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2.4
We need the following elementary fact characterizing the
product of two Gaussian functions (see, e.g., [49, Fact 1]):
Let Σ1,Σ2 ≻ 0 be positive definite matrices, let Σ0 = Σ1+
Σ2 ≻ 0 and Σ−1 = Σ−11 + Σ−12 ≻ 0, let X, c1, c2 ∈ Ck be
arbitrary, and let c3 ∈ Ck such that Σ−1c3 = Σ−11 c1+Σ−12 c2.
Then ∀x ∈ Ck,
f√Σ1(x−c1)f√Σ2(x−c2) = f√Σ0(c1−c2)f√Σ(x−c3) (77)
Now, we are ready to generalize Regev’s lemma to corre-
lated Gaussian distributions. Let c3 = ΣΣ
−1
2 x. We have
g(x) =
∑
x1∈Λ+c
f√Σ1(x1)
f√Σ1(Λ + c)
f√Σ2(x− x1)
(a)
=
∑
x1∈Λ+c
f√Σ0(x)
f√Σ1(Λ + c)
f√Σ(x1 − c3)
= f√Σ0(x)
Σx1∈Λ+cf√Σ(x1 − c3)
f√Σ1(Λ + c)
= f√Σ0(x)
f√Σ(Λ + c− c3)
f√Σ1(Λ + c)
(b)∈ f√Σ0(x)
[
1− ε
1 + ε
,
1 + ε
1− ε
]
(c)
= f√Σ0(x) [1− 4ε, 1 + 4ε]
where (a) is due to (77), (b) follows from the definition of
the flatness factor for correlated Gaussian distributions, and
(c) is because ε ≤ 12 . More precisely, since
√
Σ3  ηε(Λ),
f√Σ3(Λ + c− c3) ∈ [ 1−εV (Λ) , 1+εV (Λ) ]; moreover, since Σ1 ≻ Σ3,
we also have f√Σ1(Λ + c) ∈ [ 1−εV (Λ) , 1+εV (Λ) ].
B. Proof of Lemma 2.5
Let µ ∈ A(Λ + c). Then
P {Y = µ} = P{X = A−1µ} = f√Σ(A−1µ)
f√Σ(Λ + c)
=
e−µ
†(A−1)†Σ−1A−1µ∑
z∈Λ+c e−z
†Σ−1z
.
The thesis follows since by definition
D
A(Λ+c),
√
AΣA†
(µ) =
f√AΣA†(µ)∑
µ′∈A(Λ+c) f√AΣA†(µ′)
=
e−µ
†(A−1)†Σ−1A−1µ∑
z∈Λ+c e−(Az)
†(A−1)†Σ−1A−1(Az)
=
e−µ
†(A−1)†Σ−1A−1µ∑
z∈Λ+c e−z
†Σ−1z
.
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C. Proof of Lemma 2.7
We have
E
[
e2ℜ(t
†Ax)
]
=
∑
x∈Λ+c
DΛ+c,σ(x)e
2ℜ(t†Ax)
=
∑
x∈Λ+c
fσ(x)
fσ(Λ + c)
eℜ(t
†Ax).
Therefore we can write
fσ(Λ + c)E
[
e2ℜ(t
†Ax)
]
=
∑
x∈Λ+c
1
(πσ2)k
e−
‖x‖2
σ2
+2ℜ(t†Ax).
Using the identity∥∥∥x
σ
− σA†t
∥∥∥2 = ‖x‖2
σ2
− 2ℜ(t†Ax) + σ2 ∥∥A†t∥∥2 ,
we can rewrite the last expression as∑
x∈Λ+c
1
(πσ2)k
e−‖ xσ−σA†t‖2+σ2‖A†t‖2
= eσ
2‖A†t‖2fσ(Λ + c− σ2A†t).
Thus we have
E
[
e2ℜ(t
†Ax)
]
= eσ
2‖A†t‖2 fσ(Λ + c− σ2A†t)
fσ(Λ + c)
Adapting [6, Lemma 4] to the complex case, we find that
∀c ∈ Ck
fσ,c(Λ)
fσ(Λ)
∈
[
1− ǫΛ(σ)
1 + ǫΛ(σ)
, 1
]
.
Replacing t by t/2, we obtain
E
[
eℜ(t
†Ax)
]
=
1 + ǫΛ(σ)
1− ǫΛ(σ)e
σ2
4 ‖A†t‖2 .
D. Proof of Lemma 2.10
Before giving the proof we need some notation.
Given an ideal I of F , the complementary ideal of I is
defined as I∨ = {x ∈ F : TrF/Q(xI) ⊆ Z}. It is always an
ideal of F .
With this notation we have that
ψ(I)∗ = 2ψ(I∨F ), (78)
where overline means complex conjugation element wise11.
Proof: Let us first assume that I is an integral ideal. In
this case a classical result from algebraic number theory states
that
V (ψ(I)) = [OF : I]2−k
√
|dF |.
Noticing that
√|NF/Q(x)| = |p(ψ(x))| and using the defini-
tion of the product distance we have that
δ(ψ(I)) = 2
k
2
|dF | 14
min(I),
where min(I) := min
x∈I\{0}
√
|NF/Q(x)|
N(I) and N(I) = [OF : I] is
the norm of the ideal I. From basic algebraic number theory
11This result is well known but we do prove a more general version of it
in Appendix E.
we have that for any element of a ∈ I, |NF/Q(a)| | N(I)
and the first claim follows.
Let us now assume that I is a genuine fractional ideal. In
this case we can choose an integer n such that nI is an integral
ideal. The extension to fractional ideals now follows as for any
lattice Λ we have δ(nΛ) = δ(Λ).
In (78) we saw that ψ(I)∗ is just a complex conjugated
version of fractional ideal lattice 2ψ(I∨). Therefore the last
claim follows from the first one.
E. Proof of Lemma 4.11
Let x, y ∈ D. Then we have
trD/Q(xy) = trF/Q(trD/F (xy)) = trF/Q(Tr(φ(xy))) =
=
2k∑
i=1
αi(Tr(φ(xy))) =
2k∑
i=1
Tr(αi(φ(xy))) =
= Tr
( 2k∑
i=1
αi(φ(xy))
)
= 2ℜTr
( k∑
i=1
αi(φ(xy))
)
= 2ℜTr
( k∑
i=1
αi(φ(x))αi(φ(y))
)
= 2ℜTr((ψ(x)h)†ψ(y)).
By definition,
ψ(Γ)∗ = {X ∈Mnk×n(C) : ∀y ∈ Γ, ℜ(Tr(X†ψ(y))) ∈ Z}
and so 2ψ(Γ∨)h ⊆ ψ(Γ)∗. We would like to show that
2ψ(Γ∨)h = ψ(Γ)∗.
The trace form trD/Q : D×D → Q is a non-degenerate bilin-
ear form on the Q-vector space D. Then, any full Z-module in
D has a dual basis in D [53]. In particular, if {w1, . . . , w2n2k}
is a basis of Γ as Z-module, then there exists a dual basis
{w′1, . . . , w′2n2k} in D such that ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n2k}, we
have trD/Q(w′iwj) = δij . Therefore,
ℜTr(2(ψ(w′i)h)†ψ(wj)) = trD/Q(w′iwj) = δij
and by definition of the codifferent, this implies that ψ(w′i)
h ∈
ψ(Γ∨). Since 2ψ(Γ∨)h ⊆ ψ(Γ)∗ and it contains a dual basis
for ψ(Γ)∗, we can conclude that 2ψ(Γ∨)h = ψ(Γ)∗.
F. Sketch of the proof of Proposition 3.9
The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem
3.7. Note that the bound (35) still holds and
EHe
[
1
k
I(pM ; pz|He)
]
≤ RP
{ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
) 1
k
> eCe+δ
}
+
1
k
EHe
[
I(pM ; pz|He)
∣∣∣ k∏
i=1
(
1 +
P |he,i|2
σ2e
) 1
k≤ eCe+δ
]
The first term vanishes because of (28) and the second term
vanishes using Proposition 3.11 as before.
The proof of reliability is unchanged.
G. Sketch of the proof of Proposition 3.19
The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 3.6. We
only outline the main steps. Note that ∀γ > 0, for sufficiently
large k, we have h(Λb)k > h
2
b − γ and h(Λe)k > h2e − γ.
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Secrecy. With the same notation as in Section III-D, we have
He = I and Σ =
Pσ2e
P+σ2e
. With the same scaling as in equation
(23), we can replace the bound (32) with the following:
ηεk(Λe) ≤
2
√
kc
λ1(Λ∗e)
=
2
√
kc
h(Λ∗e)V (Λ∗e)
1
2k
=
2
√
kcV (Λe)
1
2k
h(Λ∗e)
=
2
√
kc
√
πeP
h(Λ∗e)e
R′
2
≤ 2c
√
πeP
(he − γ)eR
′
2
.
We find that ǫΛe(
√
Σ)→ 0 as long as
√
Σ =
√
Pσe√
P + σ2e
>
2c
√
πeP
(he − γ)
√
2πe
R′
2
.
This condition is equivalent to
R′ > ln
e
π(he − γ) + ln
(
1 +
P
σ2e
)
. (79)
Reliability. With the same notation as in Section III-E, we
have R =
√
1+ρb
ρb
I . With the scaling (23), the error probability
tends to zero if (42) holds, that is
1
4πσ2b
>
2c2kρb
(1 + ρb)λ1(Λb)2
=
2c2kρb
h(Λb)2V (Λb)
1
k
=
2c2ρbe
R+R′
(1 + ρb)(hb − γ)πeP .
Recalling that ρb = P/σ
2
b , after some elementary calculations
we find
R +R′ < ln
(
1 +
P
σ2b
)
− ln
(
4
πe
)
+ ln(hb − γ). (80)
Combining equations (79) and (80), and taking γ → 0, we get
the desired result.
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